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I. INTRODUCTION 
News leaks from government sources began appearing in the press 
even before the nation’s capital relocated to the District of Columbia in 
1800, and they have remained a staple of American political communication 
ever since.1  Leaks have boosted the efforts of some public officials, 
enraged others, and triggered occasional investigations for more than 
two hundred years.  Only rarely, however, did disputes over the identity 
of government sources end up in court, leaving journalists’ confidentiality 
law to coalesce from cases with factual settings bearing little resemblance 
to the typical political leak.  Most notably, Branzburg v. Hayes,2 the 
 1. The term leak originally applied to inadvertent slips by sources but has since 
acquired a broader, more active meaning.  A leak is the calculated release of information 
to reporters with the stipulation that the source remain unidentified.  See HATCHET JOBS 
AND HARDBALL: THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL SLANG 162-63 
(Grant Barrett ed., 2004); 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 759 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. 
Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989).  Leaks authorized by an agency’s officials are sometimes 
known as plants.  See STEPHEN HESS, THE GOVERNMENT/PRESS CONNECTION 75 (1984).  
Though now dated, the most thorough review of different conceptions of leaks is 
Muhammad A. Dahlan, Anonymous Disclosure of Government Information as a Form of 
Political Communication 19-38 (1967) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Illinois) (on file with Author).  See also infra Part IV (discussing the various types of 
leaks).  For this Article, leak denotes any information released to the press by a 
government source with an expectation of anonymity, ranging from high-ranking elected 
or appointed officials to staff members or employees.  Leaks can also spring from 
nongovernmental institutions, but as used here the term carries the narrower meaning of 
a source in government.  For a discussion of whistleblowing in business that notes 
important parallels with leaks from government, see, for example, Terry Morehead 
Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Employee Disclosures to the Media: When Is a 
“Source” a “Sourcerer”?, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 357 (1993). 
 2. 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (rejecting a First Amendment privilege for reporters to 
refuse to testify before grand juries when witnessing possible crimes).  For further 
discussion of this case, see infra Part III.B. 
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Supreme Court’s only direct engagement with journalists’ confidentiality,3 
never mentioned the word leak and only obliquely addressed the place of 
anonymous sources in political communication.4  Journalists’ confidentiality 
law thus developed with scant consideration for the role of leaks in 
governance.5
A spate of recent stories highlights the importance of leaks and 
reminds journalists of the tenuous legal status of any confidentiality 
promises they make.6  In 2005, a special counsel hauled several journalists 
before a grand jury, and jailed one for twelve weeks in pursuit of sources 
who had leaked the name of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
operative.7  Later that year the Washington Post published a story, based 
on leaks, about secret overseas U.S. prisons for terrorists,8 and the New 
York Times revealed that the National Security Agency had been 
monitoring telecommunications without warrants since the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001.9  Both of these stories also triggered leak 
 3. Since Branzburg, “the Court has never again accepted for review a case 
directly raising issues surrounding the constitutional privilege,” and has provided only 
indirect guidance in other types of cases.  C. THOMAS DIENES, LEE LEVINE, & ROBERT C. 
LIND, NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW 930 (3d ed. 2005).  “Perhaps because these 
infrequent and decidedly nondefinitive clues concerning the contours of the privilege are 
all that the Court has offered since Branzburg, they continue to be consulted and 
interpreted with something approaching talmudic passion.”  Id. 
 4. The Court cites, but does not discuss, its seminal case dealing with anonymous 
communication by a pamphleteer.  Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 680 (citing Talley v. 
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)). 
 5. See Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Branzburg Revisited: Confidential Sources 
and First Amendment Values, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 13, 14, 32-33 (1988). 
 6. Besides the major controversies surrounding leaks discussed in this paragraph, 
another set of 2005 cases held the attention of journalists.  Several reporters were held in 
contempt for refusing to identify government sources sought by Dr. Wen Ho Lee for his 
suit claiming that leaks accusing him of espionage had violated his rights under federal 
privacy law.  See Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Lee v. Dep’t of 
Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2005); infra notes 223-34 and accompanying text. 
 7. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 966-67 (D.C. Cir. 
2005); see also David Johnston & Richard W. Stevenson, Cheney Aide Charged with 
Lying in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at A1; David Johnston & Richard W. 
Stevenson, Times Reporter Gives Testimony in C.I.A. Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2005, at A1; infra Part III.D. 
 8. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons; Debate Is Growing 
Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set up After 9/11, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A1. 
 9. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 




investigations.10  Even history fueled the debate over leaks in 2005.  
Deep Throat, the anonymous source who had kept the Washington 
Post’s Watergate reporting on track, stepped forward to end thirty years 
of speculation about his identity.11
When leaks produce legal battles over the identities of unnamed sources, 
an uncommon occurrence until recently,12 journalists’ confidentiality 
law treats them as disputes over evidence and ignores both their origins 
as political speech and their value to governance.  Unlike the situations 
presented in Branzburg, the recent CIA leak case stemmed from partisan 
and bureaucratic maneuvering.  The leak itself targeted a George W. 
Bush administration critic, while the ensuing probe to ferret out the 
unnamed sources was partly actuated by CIA and White House officials 
jockeying to blame each other for intelligence failures.13  Although the 
appellate court noted the political roots of the case and used the word 
leak throughout its opinions, the legal rules it applied adhered closely to 
 10. See, e.g., David Johnston & Carl Hulse, C.I.A. Asks Criminal Inquiry Over 
Secret-Prison Article, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at A18; Scott Shane, Criminal Inquiry 
Opens into Leak in Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2005, at A1.  The secret-
prisons story even triggered a leak investigation overseas.  See Doreen Carvajal, Swiss 
Investigate Leak to Paper on C.I.A. Prisons in Eastern Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 
2006, at A11. 
 11. See BOB WOODWARD, THE SECRET MAN: THE STORY OF WATERGATE’S DEEP 
THROAT (2005); John D. O’Connor, “I’m the Guy They Called Deep Throat,” VANITY 
FAIR, July 2005, at 86; see also infra notes 359-62 and accompanying text (discussing 
the role of leaks in Watergate). 
 12. Accurate counts of subpoenas seeking the identity of government sources as a 
subset of all subpoenas served on the press are elusive.  The Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press most thoroughly tracks legal battles involving all aspects of 
journalists’ confidentiality.  See Shields and Subpoenas, http://www.rcfp.org/shields_and_ 
subpoenas.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).  The Committee’s homepage, http://www. 
rcfp.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2006), refers to “the unprecedented number of federal 
subpoenas.”  See also Douglas McCollam, Why the Plame Case Is So Scary: Attack at 
the Source, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar./Apr. 2005, at 29 (2005) (listing several 
confidentiality cases involving government sources).  In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
the Nixon administration obtained dozens, maybe hundreds, of subpoenas to get 
information from the press about counterculture activities, but these did not target 
sources in government.  See Margaret Sherwood, Note, The Newsman’s Privilege: 
Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 CAL. L. 
REV. 1198, 1202 (1970). 
 13. See Scott Shane, Ex-Diplomat’s Surprise Volley on Iraq Drove White House 
Into Political Warfare Mode, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, § 1, at 20 (“Behind the scenes, 
the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council were skirmishing 
over who would take the blame for inaccurate intelligence.”).  Several months later, 
reports indicated that both President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney 
had approved intelligence leaks about Iraq’s weapons program.  See David Johnston & 
David E. Sanger, Cheney’s Aide Says President Approved Leak, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 
2006, at A1; see also Christopher Hitchens, The Insider, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, § 7, 
at 8 (comparing Nixon era bureaucratic infighting that led to leaks with 
intragovernmental disagreements over the Iraq War that prompted leaks). 
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those established by the Supreme Court in 1972.14  Other examples 
further illustrate the political essence of most leaks.  For instance, the 
judge supervising independent counsel Kenneth Starr’s investigation of 
President Bill Clinton felt compelled to appoint a special master in 1998 
to examine the flood of leaks from that probe.15  With leaks so thoroughly 
steeped in politics, courtrooms hardly seem the most appropriate venue, 
nor do the customary rules of evidence provide the best tools, to balance 
the interests at stake. 
Journalists’ standard argument for an evidentiary privilege—that 
confidentiality assures a continuing flow of information to the public16—
understates the importance of leaks.  The assertion that informants with 
sensitive information will dry up unless journalists guarantee their 
confidentiality applies to all reporter-source relations and ignores 
considerations specific to leaks from government sources.  Speech about 
government occupies a special place in the American system of free 
expression.  The venerable notion of the press as the fourth estate, one of the 
checks and balances in governance, partly epitomizes this conception.17  
 14. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(“[T]his litigation began with a political and news media controversy over a sixteen-
word sentence in the State of the Union Address of President George W. Bush on 
January 28, 2003.”). 
 15. The White House and Starr pointed to one another as the source of the leaks.  
James Bennet, Whispered Secrets Start a Loud Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1998, at 
A15.  News analysts observed that this was but the latest instance of a prosecutor seeking 
tactical advantages by leaking information from supposedly secret grand jury 
proceedings.  See William Glaberson, Pssst, Says Prosecutor to Reporter; I’m All Ears, 
Is the Reply, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1998, at A22.  After several months, Judge Norma 
Holloway Johnson appointed a special master to investigate whether leaks from the 
independent counsel’s office violated rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure governing grand jury secrecy.  See Neil A. Lewis, Judge Cites Possible 
Improper Leaks by Starr Office, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1998, at A9.  The leaks prompted 
Judge Holloway to order the Justice Department to launch a criminal investigation of 
Starr’s office, but an appeals court reversed.  See Neil A. Lewis, A Leak from Starr’s 
Office Was Not Illegal, Court Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1999, at A18.  Charles G. 
Bakaly III, former spokesman for the office of independent counsel, was prosecuted but 
acquitted for lying about leaks.  John M. Broder, Starr’s Ex-Spokesman Charged with 
Contempt in Case on Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2000, at A10; David Stout, Aide to Starr 
Is Acquitted of Contempt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2000, at A12. 
 16. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-80 (1972) (summarizing 
petitioners’ argument as follows: compelling the disclosure of sources will deter others 
from providing information “all to the detriment of the free flow of information 
protected by the First Amendment”). 
 17. See generally TIMOTHY W. GLEASON, THE WATCHDOG CONCEPT (1990) 
(tracing the origins of the watchdog concept in First Amendment theory to nineteenth-
century cases); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 




The watchdog role, however, overemphasizes the adversarial nature of 
press-government relations by discounting the many ways that officials use 
the media to govern.18  Leaks warrant a distinct status in confidentiality 
law because they serve governance both ways.  In a system with divided 
but shared powers, leaks supplement or complement official communications 
as well as challenge them. 
The flow-of-information-to-the-public argument also falls short in 
court because it conflates two claims—reporters’ right to gather news 
and the public’s right to receive it—neither of which rests on solid 
constitutional footing.19  In contrast, treating leaks as speech by and 
about government emphasizes their political and institutional role, 
shifting the basis for claiming an evidentiary privilege into a new realm.  
It also distinguishes them from other situations in which journalists 
invoke an evidentiary privilege.  Leaks would thus warrant greater 
protection whether analyzed using classic First Amendment doctrine, 
which treats political speech as the core value at stake,20 or more recent 
approaches focusing on the social and institutional contexts of 
communication.21  As courts grapple with leak cases, and as legislatures, 
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977) (arguing that the watchdog or checking role of the 
press underpins a wide range of First Amendment decisions); Potter Stewart, “Or of the 
Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975) (arguing that the First Amendment’s language 
mentioning the press in addition to speech suggests that the media deserve special 
institutional protection).  The watchdog role fits squarely in the libertarian conception of 
the press.  See generally Fred S. Siebert, The Libertarian Theory of the Press, in FOUR 
THEORIES OF THE PRESS 39 (Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, & Wilbur Schramm eds., 
1956) (providing the historical, cultural, and philosophical context for the idea that a free 
press exists in tension with government). 
 18. See generally TIMOTHY E. COOK, GOVERNING WITH THE NEWS: THE NEWS 
MEDIA AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION (1998) (providing a historically sensitive look, by a 
political scientist, at the central role occupied by the press in governance); RICHARD B. 
KIELBOWICZ, NEWS IN THE MAIL: THE PRESS, POST OFFICE, AND PUBLIC INFORMATION, 
1700-1860S (1989) (noting how early Congresses facilitated communication between 
officials and the electorate by conferring postal privileges on the press).  In contrast to 
the largely negative role for government in the libertarian conception of the press, the 
social responsibility theory recognizes that government has an affirmative duty to 
enhance communication.  See generally 1 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND 
MASS COMMUNICATIONS: A REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 
(1947) (discussing government’s various roles in improving public communication 
consistent with First Amendment principles); Theodore Peterson, The Social Responsibility 
Theory of the Press, in FOUR THEORIES, supra note 17, at 73 (sketching the historical, 
technological, and philosophical bases for an affirmative government role in 
communication). 
 19. On the right to gather and receive information, see infra notes 400-03 and 
accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 389-94 and accompanying text. 
 21. The work of Frederick Schauer and Robert C. Post are especially noteworthy 
in rethinking First Amendment analysis.  Schauer recommends applying the First 
Amendment in a fashion that recognizes the “contingent institutional elements of our 
collective life” instead of categorizing speech “on the basis of the content of the 
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including Congress,22 consider shield laws, they should carefully weigh 
the political and institutional contributions of anonymous communications 
from government sources.  Any judicial or legislative rules governing 
leaks should start with a strong presumption in favor of protecting a 
leaker’s identity.  They should then incorporate elements in the legal analysis 
beyond the criteria now customarily used in deciding confidentiality 
cases.23
When the Supreme Court first grappled with prior restraints and the 
rights of reporters to attend criminal trials, it looked to history and the 
societal functions of the media in establishing presumptions that favored 
the press.24  This Article follows a similar path.  Part II sketches the role 
communication.”  Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1256, 1259 (2005); see also Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of 
the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 1765 (2004); Frederick Schauer, Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First 
Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998).  Post focuses less on the institutions of 
communication, but agrees with Schauer that First Amendment applications should be 
more sensitive to the “particular social practices” connected with communication and the 
“nature and constitutional significance of such practices.”  Robert C. Post, Recuperating 
First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1250 (1995). 
 22. The controversy over contempt citations for journalists in the CIA leak case 
led to the latest congressional consideration of a federal shield law.  See Free Flow of 
Information Act of 2005, S. 1419, 109th Cong. (2005); Free Flow of Information Act of 
2005, H.R. 3323, 109th Cong. (2005); Free Speech Protection Act of 2005, S. 369, 109th 
Cong. (2005).  The Senate held hearings on these bills in 2005.  See Reporters’ Privilege 
Legislation: Issues and Implications: Hearings Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th 
Cong. (2005), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1579; Reporters’ 
Privilege Legislation: An Additional Investigation of Issues and Implications: Hearings 
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://judiciary. 
senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1637.  For similar bills introduced in the wake of Branzburg, 
see infra Part III.C.1. 
 23. For a discussion of the traditional elements considered in journalists’ 
confidentiality cases, see infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text. 
 24. In the first prior restraint case to come before it, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 
697, 713 (1931), the Supreme Court relied heavily on a review of historical experience to 
conclude that such restrictions should be presumed unconstitutional.  “The question is 
whether a statute authorizing such proceedings in restraint of publication is consistent 
with the conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed.”  
Id. at 713.  Similarly, in the Supreme Court’s first direct engagement with the 
constitutional right of the press and public to attend criminal trials, Chief Justice Warren 
Burger’s opinion relied heavily on historical experience and the functional role of the 
press in reporting on the legal system.  Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 
555, 564-73 (1980).  “From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons 
as valid today as in centuries past, we are bound to conclude that a presumption of 
openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice.”  Id. at 
573.  Several years later, the Court expressly incorporated historical and functional tests 
into the process a judge must follow before closing pre- or post-trial proceedings or 




of leaks in governance between the adoption of the Constitution and 
World War II to underscore the integral role leaks have played in the 
nation’s political communication.  Part III shows that the general law of 
journalists’ confidentiality before and after Branzburg developed with 
little regard for the distinct institutional contributions of leaks.  Part IV 
provides two perspectives on leaks that underscore their centrality in 
modern governance.  When considered together, these perspectives suggest 
guidelines for courts as they weigh the value of different types of leaks.  
Finally, Part V recommends how the legal principles currently regulating 
journalists’ confidentiality can be adjusted slightly to accommodate the 
contributions of political leaks to governance. 
II.  A HISTORICAL SNAPSHOT OF LEAKS AND THEIR                                   
ROLE IN GOVERNANCE 
Leaks to the press have always figured in the formal and informal 
processes of government, though their frequency and character have 
changed with developments in journalism and shifts in institutional 
power.  The earliest leaks and leak investigations stemmed from partisan 
maneuvering in Congress, the principal locus of federal decisionmaking 
for most of the nineteenth century.  With the emergence of the modern 
administrative state in the late 1800s, leaks began springing from many 
government agencies as part of a burgeoning culture of news management. 
A. Leaks in the Era of Congressional Dominance and a Partisan Press 
Leaks that involved Congress in the nineteenth century served at least 
four purposes. They armed minority factions with the power of publicity, 
gave lawmakers leverage in battles with the White House, exposed 
congressional corruption, and prompted investigations of executive 
departments.25  To accomplish their goals, congressional leakers typically 
sealing pre- or post-trial documents.  Press-Enter. Co. v. Riverside Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1 
(1986).  In the first phase of the process, a judge determines whether a proceeding or 
document is presumptively open by considering whether it has historically been open to 
the press and public, or whether access functions positively in the judicial system and 
society.  Id. at 10-12.  Although this Article tackles a different topic, it likewise provides 
background for a historical test in Part II and a functional evaluation of leaks in Part IV. 
 25. The most thorough studies of congressional leaks and the press are Leigh F. 
Gregg, The First Amendment in the Nineteenth Century: Journalists’ Privilege and 
Congressional Investigations (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Wisconsin) (on file with University of Wisconsin Library); and Thomas H. Kaminski, 
Congress, Correspondents, and Confidentiality in the Nineteenth Century (1976) 
(unpublished M.S. thesis, San Diego State University) (on file with Claremont Colleges 
Libraries) [hereinafter Correspondents and Confidentiality].  See also Thomas H. Kaminski, 
Congress, Correspondents and Confidentiality in the 19th Century: A Preliminary Study, 4 
JOURNALISM HIST. 83 (1977) (summarizing findings from his thesis). 
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planted their stories with like-minded partisan newspapers.26  Investigations 
of the leaks themselves or the problems they exposed frequently 
ensnared reporters, some of whom cooperated while others protected 
their sources.  When congressional investigations turned into legal battles 
over journalists’ confidentiality, reporters relied mainly on claims of 
personal honor that they had given their word, rather than assertions of 
abstract press rights. 
The first significant leak occurred as part of the fierce partisan 
struggles between Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans.27  A 1795 
leak by Republican Senators embarrassed President George Washington, 
the congressional majority, and the Chief Justice—all Federalists.  The 
Senators violated their chamber’s order enjoining members to secrecy 
and passed along to a journalistic ally information about the first treaty 
signed after the adoption of the Constitution.28  Negotiated by Chief 
 26. Early Presidents also wrote anonymously for friendly papers or encouraged 
others in their administrations to do so.  See JAMES E. POLLARD, THE PRESIDENTS AND 
THE PRESS 40, 129, 156-57, 353 (1947) (discussing anonymous contributions to the press 
by Vice President John Adams and Presidents John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, 
and Abraham Lincoln).  On partisan journalism and the close relations between the press 
and government through the Civil War, see generally WILLIAM E. AMES, A HISTORY OF 
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER (1972); CULVER H. SMITH, THE PRESS, POLITICS, AND 
PATRONAGE: THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT’S USE OF NEWSPAPERS, 1789-1875 (1977). 
 27. Of course, leaks to the press occurred before the organization of the U.S. 
government.  See, e.g., Larry L. Burriss, America’s First Newspaper Leak: Tom Paine 
and the Disclosure of Secret French Aid to the United States (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Ohio University) (on file with Ohio University Library).  More generally, 
the practice of attacking authorities through anonymous and pseudonymous articles and 
pamphlets was well established before the Revolutionary War, though such actions may 
not qualify as leaks.  Benjamin Franklin recalled a 1722 incident involving his older 
brother’s New England Courant: “One of the Pieces in our News-Paper, on some 
political Point which I have now forgotten, gave Offence to the [colonial] Assembly.  He 
was taken up, censur’d and imprison’d for a Month by the Speaker’s Warrant, I suppose 
because he would not discover his Author.”  THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN 69 (Leonard W. Labaree et al. eds., Yale Univ. Press 1964) (1790); see also 
JEFFREY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY AMERICAN 
JOURNALISM 100-04 (1988) (discussing the circumstances that led to James Franklin’s 
imprisonment for legislative contempt).  As part of the 1735 seditious libel prosecution 
of John Peter Zenger, the royal governor offered a reward to anyone who identified the 
author(s) of the offending articles.  See JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE 
CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER 18 (Stanley N. Katz ed., Harvard Univ. Press, 
2d ed. 1972) (1736). 
 28. The Senate adopted an order “[t]hat the Senators be under an injunction of 
secrecy on the communications this day received from the President of the United States, 
until the further order of the Senate.” 1 S. EXEC. J. 178 (4th Cong., Spec. Sess. (1795)); 
see also JAMES TAGG, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN BACHE AND THE PHILADELPHIA AURORA 244-




Justice John Jay, the treaty offered concessions to the British that 
discomfited even Federalists.29  When the staunchly Republican Aurora 
published the treaty, so many people thronged the newspaper’s office to 
get a copy that the scene “was more like a fair than anything else,” the 
editor’s wife remarked.30
Five years later, the same newspaper became the first target of a leak 
investigation.  Its new editor, William Duane, who had been prosecuted 
under state and federal sedition laws for earlier criticisms of the 
Federalists,31 published a story about a politically sensitive bill based on 
information leaked from a secret Senate session.32  The Federalist bill, 
introduced in anticipation of the 1800 election, proposed to revise the 
procedure for deciding the outcome of close presidential races.33  
Recognizing the incendiary nature of the proposal,34 outraged 
Jeffersonian Senators ignored the confidentiality rule and passed the 
news to Duane.35
The ensuing leak inquiry, called “the first congressional investigation 
of the press, the first forcible detention of a journalist by Congress, and 
the first citation [of a journalist] for contempt of Congress,” then became 
as much the issue as the leak itself.36  One Republican Senator defended 
anonymous communications about public affairs.  “Men who engage in 
public life, or are members of legislative bodies, must expect to be 
exposed to anonymous, and sometimes avowed, attacks on their 
47 (1991); Everette E. Dennis, Stolen Peace Treaties and the Press: Two Case Studies, 2 
JOURNALISM HIST. 6 (1975). 
 29. See TAGG, supra note 28, at 239-44. 
 30. Quoted in Bernard Fay, Benjamin Franklin Bache, A Democratic Leader of the 
Eighteenth Century, 40 PROC. AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOC’Y (n.s.) 277, 293 (1931); see also 
Dennis, supra note 28, at 7-8. 
 31. A jury acquitted Duane for circulating a petition against the Alien and Sedition 
Acts, and Federalists prosecuted him under federal sedition law for alleging that the 
British exerted undue influence on the State Department.  Federalists abandoned the 
case, however, when Duane claimed to have a letter from President John Adams leveling 
the same charge.  See RICHARD N. ROSENFELD, AMERICAN AURORA: A DEMOCRATIC-
REPUBLICAN RETURNS 592-95, 771 (1997); JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: 
THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 279-88 (1956). 
 32. See S. MISC. DOC. NO. 53-278, at 7-8 (2d Sess. 1894) [hereinafter PRECEDENTS 
OF THE SENATE & HOUSE]; ROSENFELD, supra note 31, at 746-70. 
 33. See SMITH, supra note 31, at 288-89. 
 34. The proposal prompted even a Federalist to proclaim that “the Senate ought to 
be hanged, I mean the Federal part of the Senate.”  JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: 
THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 200 (1952). 
 35. DONALD A. RITCHIE, PRESS GALLERY: CONGRESS AND THE WASHINGTON 
CORRESPONDENTS 10 (1991). 
 36. Id. at 10.  But see ERNEST J. EBERLING, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: A 
STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO INVESTIGATE 
AND PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT 37-41 (Octagon Books 1973) (1928) (noting an earlier 
congressional citation for contempt, but one not involving a journalist); see also SMITH, 
supra note 31, at 288-306 (providing the best discussion of this incident). 
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principles and opinions.”37  Ironically, Vice President Jefferson, as the 
presiding officer, represented the Senate in investigating his journalistic 
ally Duane to determine the source of the leak.38  Brought before the 
Senate, Duane requested a delay to consult with counsel, but leading 
Republican attorneys refused to defend him in a chamber that set its own 
rules.39  Duane never returned to the Senate and lawmakers held him in 
contempt but made no effort to enforce their order.40  Once Congress 
adjourned, Duane reappeared in public as a “persecuted Patriot, & 
Martyr to the Liberty of the Press.”41
Duane was but the first of at least 222 correspondents, news writers, 
and editors who were asked by congressional committees during the 
nineteenth century to identify sources or disclose other information.42  
Most of the major leak investigations before the Civil War involved the 
Senate because of its general penchant for secrecy, especially in 
reviewing treaties.43  But efforts to conduct Senate business in closed 
executive sessions were “little more than a charade since the press so 
easily uncovered and reported their substance, quoted their speeches, 
and reprinted tallies of votes cast,” according to a Senate historian.44  For 
instance, the Democratic Washington-based Daily Times reported that 
Whig officials were conspiring, perhaps treasonously, with the British 
minister in an 1846 deal to resolve a boundary dispute with Canada.45  
During the Senate inquiry, the paper identified its sources.  Under oath, 
however, these individuals denied that they had passed information to 
the Daily Times.46  The investigating committee found the paper’s 
 37. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 78 (1800) (remarks of Sen. Charles Pinckney of South 
Carolina). 
 38. See MILLER, supra note 34, at 201. 
 39. Id. at 200-01; ROSENFELD, supra note 31, at 761. 
 40. See PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, supra note 32, at 14-16; RITCHIE, 
supra note 35, at 11.  The Senate did urge his prosecution for sedition.  His indictment 
under federal sedition law was dismissed after the election of Thomas Jefferson as 
President.  MILLER, supra note 34, at 202. 
 41. Letter from William Bingham to Rufus King (Aug. 6, 1800) in 3 THE LIFE AND 
CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 284 (Charles R. King ed., New York, G. P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1896). 
 42. For a thorough accounting of journalists called before Congress to testify about 
their sources or secret information they published, see Gregg, supra note 25, at 526. 
 43. RITCHIE, supra note 35, at 163. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Much of the pertinent material in connection with this episode is reprinted in 
PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, supra note 32, at 45-76. 
 46. Id. at 65-74. 




charges false, and the Senate expelled the Daily Times from the chamber’s 
press galleries.47
The Senate’s secret review of treaties also led to three incidents 
between 1844 and 1848 in which newspapers published whole documents, 
not just information about them.48  Most significantly, the New York 
Herald’s publication of the still secret 1848 treaty that ended the war 
with Mexico prompted a rare confinement of a journalist, an even rarer 
court decision, and one of the few wide-ranging nineteenth-century 
debates about leaks.49  The paper’s correspondent, John Nugent, refused 
to name his source, though he denied that it was anyone connected with 
the Senate.50  The Senate cited Nugent for contempt, and confined him 
in a committee room for several days, but he still managed to file articles 
for the Herald under the dateline “Custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms of 
the Senate.”51  Nugent challenged the Senate’s confinement by filing a 
writ of habeas corpus.  Judge William Cranch, however, ruled solidly for 
the Senate.52  He noted the Senate’s authority to “punish all contempts of 
its authority” and the merits of its standing rules protecting the secrecy 
of communications from the President, especially for treaty deliberations.53  
To save face, the Senate finally released Nugent because of the prisoner’s 
supposed poor health.54
In one of its last comments on the Nugent matter, the Herald offered a 
“Statistical Table of the Leaks of the United States Senate” that 
underscored the hypocrisy of the Senate’s action and indicated how 
leaks had become a common tool of political communication.55  The 
table’s first column listed newspapers in five leading cities, the second 
 47. See id. at 76. 
 48. Documents published in connection with an 1844 treaty to annex Texas led the 
Senate to censure one of its own members for the disclosure.  RITCHIE, supra note 35, at 
28.  In 1846, the Senate investigated two correspondents who obtained the treaty settling 
the Oregon boundary dispute.  Id. 
 49. See F. B. MARBUT, NEWS FROM THE CAPITAL: THE STORY OF WASHINGTON 
REPORTING 85-93 (1971). 
 50. 7 S. EXEC. J. 354-404 (30th Cong., 1st Sess. 1848) (reporting the interrogation 
of Nugent about the source of the leak). 
 51. See, e.g., Galviensis and the Senate, N.Y. HERALD, Apr. 13, 1848, at 3 
(Galviensis was Nugent’s pen name). 
 52. Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471, 483 (C.C.D.C. 1848) (No. 10,375). 
 53. Id.  The Supreme Court narrowed congressional contempt power in Kilbourn 
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).  For a state court ruling similar to Nugent, see Ex 
parte D.O. McCarthy, 29 Cal. 395 (1866).  A San Francisco newspaper had reported that 
members of the state senate received thousands of dollars to secure their votes on a bill; 
the editor refused to identify his sources and was held in contempt of the legislature.  
McCarthy, 29 Cal. at 397-99; Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 269-
72.  The editor unsuccessfully challenged his detention in the state supreme court.  
McCarthy, 29 Cal. at 407. 
 54. RITCHIE, supra note 35, at 29. 
 55. Presidential, Senatorial and Diplomatic Secrecy, N.Y. HERALD, May 3, 1848, at 2. 
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named the correspondent for each, and the third identified senators who 
favored each reporter with confidential information.56  “The whig Senators 
were . . . the most comprehensive leakers,” the Herald noted wryly, “but 
some of the democratic Senators were the most accurate leakers during 
these mysterious debates.”57
The focus of major leaks and the relationship of reporters to the stories 
both shifted perceptively in the second half of the nineteenth century.  
The Senate’s secret review of treaties continued to pique reportorial 
curiosity,58 but leaks increasingly dealt with allegations of corruption 
in Congress and federal agencies.  At the same time, Washington 
correspondents became more than conduits for stories of partisan 
maneuvering.  Some figured centrally in the stories themselves, which 
complicated congressional investigations.59
An 1857 story based partly on leaked information prompted the 
resignations of three members of Congress and the passage of a law that 
compelled testimony in congressional hearings.  In January, the New 
York Times printed an article from its Washington correspondent, James 
W. Simonton, charging that lobbyists induced corrupt members of 
Congress to enact the Minnesota Land Bill that granted land to railroads.60  
An accompanying editorial referred to the “new and magnificent land-
stealing scheme,” alleging that some congressmen received $1000 for 
their vote.61  The ensuing investigation followed two tracks.  One dealt 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Three examples convey the flavor of Senate leak investigations in connection 
with treaties.  “A treaty negotiated early in 1854 by southern railroad promoter James 
Gadsden, who represented President Pierce, and Mexican President Santa Ana was 
leaked to the press prior to declassification of the document.”  Correspondents and 
Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 237.  In this case, however, the Senate investigated just 
its members, not the press.  Id. at 237-38.  In 1871, the Senate investigated how reporters 
obtained copies of the Treaty of Washington.  See PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, 
supra note 32, at 311-504; see also RITCHIE, supra note 35, at 90-91.  In 1881 the Senate 
sought to determine how the press obtained proposed treaties with China, and then 
investigated how news of the secret leak investigation itself was leaked.  See 
Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 312-15. 
 59. On general changes in relations between reporters and their Washington 
sources from the Civil War to the early 1900s, see MARBUT, supra note 49, at 134-60; 
MARK WAHLGREN SUMMERS, THE PRESS GANG: NEWSPAPERS AND POLITICS, 1865-1878, 
1-8 (1994). 
 60. H.R. REP. NO. 34-243, at 160 (3d Sess. 1857); The Pacific Railroad—Minnesota Land 
Grant—A Monster Speculation—Congressional Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1857, at 1.  
 61. Editorial, Piracies of the Washington Lobby—The Land Robberies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1857, at 4. 




with the substance of the charges, which forced three resignations, while 
the other focused on the leak.62
During the debate to establish a select investigating committee, one 
lawmaker denounced newspaper correspondents as “those demented 
fragments of humanity that hang around this Hall merely for the purpose 
of gathering up every whisper and every word that may fall from the lips 
of a member, even in private conversation, and trumpeting it throughout 
the land.”63  New York Times editor and publisher Henry J. Raymond 
and the paper’s Washington correspondent James W. Simonton testified 
before the select committee about a week after the offending articles 
appeared.64  Both disavowed having direct knowledge of actual bribes, 
but they insisted they had heard about them from reliable sources.65  
Simonton said that members of Congress routinely asked if they could 
trust him to keep their confidences.  “In my profession, such questions 
are put to me almost every day . . . and I always, unless I have some special 
reasons for supposing that the particular individual has an improper 
proposal to make, accept their confidence, and give my unqualified 
promise not to reveal their names.”66  He testified that two lawmakers 
had directly asked him to broker bribes and others had intimated that 
they wanted the reporter’s help to arrange payments for their votes.67  
When Simonton refused to identify his sources, the House held him in 
contempt for nineteen days.68  The House investigation also revealed that 
Simonton had acted as a lobbyist in a minor capacity some years earlier; 
lawmakers used this finding to expel him from the press galleries.69
One day after the House voted to hold Simonton in contempt, it passed 
a bill to punish recalcitrant witnesses and the Senate quickly concurred.70  
The 1857 legislative contempt statute set a maximum fine of $1000 and 
a one year jail sentence for anyone who “refuse[s] to answer any 
question pertinent to the matter of inquiry in consideration . . . .”71  
Simonton, in fact, had cited the absence of such a clear-cut law as one 
 62. H.R. REP. NO. 34-243 (3d Sess. 1857); CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 
274-77 (1857); PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, supra note 32, at 85-190.  
 63. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 276 (1857) (quoting remarks of Rep. 
Brenton); PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, supra note 32, at 92. 
 64. H.R. REP. NO. 34-243, at 154-79 (3d Sess. 1857). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 162. 
 67. Id. at 166-67. 
 68. See PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, supra note 32, at 117-27; 
Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 243-44. 
 69. Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 243-44. 
 70. See PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, supra note 32, at 129-90 (tracing 
the congressional deliberations on the law). 
 71. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 29, 11 Stat. 155 (1857) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 192 
(2000)). 
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basis for his refusal to answer questions.  “You have not on your statute-
books any law forbidding that confidence—none whatever,” he told the 
House.72  “Make such a law, and I will observe it.  Make such a law, and 
when Mr. A or Mr. B comes to me, and wishes to make a confidential 
communication, I will say to him: ‘Yes, I will receive it, subject always 
to the provisions of this law.’”73  The 1857 statute, however, did little 
more than codify Congress’s inherent contempt power recognized by the 
courts nine years earlier.74
Regardless of the statute, stories about official corruption based on 
anonymous sources proliferated after mid-century, especially during the 
scandal-ridden Gilded Age.75  Accordingly, leak investigations peaked in 
the 1870s.76  Between 1870 and 1876, confrontations between Congress 
and reporters over unnamed sources occurred as part of investigations 
into mismanagement at the Freedman’s Bureau,77 bribes allegedly 
offered to congressmen by lobbyists for Cuban rebels,78 charges of 
corruption against the secretary of the Navy and his department,79 
distributions of Union Pacific Railroad stock to lawmakers in the 
infamous Credit Mobilier scandal,80 rumors that lobbyists bribed 
congressmen and reporters to support subsidies for the Pacific Mail 
 72. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong. 3d Sess. 411 (1857). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471 (C.C.D.C. 1848) (No. 10,375); EBERLING, 
supra note 36, at 341-91 (discussing early judicial review of congressional power to 
compel testimony and punish for contempt); supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text 
(discussing Nugent). 
 75. See generally SUMMERS, supra note 59 (discussing the role of the press in 
Gilded Age politics).  Of course, not all mid-century leaks involved corruption; some 
investigations were instituted more as political retribution.  In 1860, for instance, a 
Republican congressman launched a leak investigation—basically a fishing expedition 
that involved several journalists—to determine whether the Democratic administration of 
James Buchanan was using bribes to secure the passage of laws in Congress.  See H.R. 
REP. NO. 36-648 (1st Sess. 1860); see also Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra 
note 25, at 244-48.  An 1862 House Judiciary Committee investigation of telegraphic 
censorship in Washington expanded its scope to determine how the New York Herald 
obtained an early version of President Abraham Lincoln’s State of the Union address; the 
investigation, which suggested that Lincoln’s wife was the source, gave radical 
Republicans an opportunity to embarrass the President.  See id. at 250-67. 
 76. Gregg, supra note 25, at 584 (“The 1870s produced the most recorded 
investigations and the most testimony from journalists.”). 
 77. See H.R. REP. NO. 41-121 (2d Sess. 1870). 
 78. See H.R. REP. NO. 41-104 (2d Sess. 1870); 2 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES § 1635, at 1108-09 (1907). 
 79. See H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 42-201 (2d Sess. 1872). 
 80. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 42-77 (3d Sess. 1873). 




Steamship Line,81 election frauds in Alabama,82 malfeasance in the War 
Department,83 and the misuse of money appropriated for Indian tribes by 
the Interior Department.84  Although Congress conducted fewer leak 
investigations in the 1880s and 1890s, lawmakers still sought information 
from at least twenty-three journalists during these two decades.85
One late nineteenth-century investigation underscored the confounding 
nature of leaks.  They shed light on government operations but, by using 
anonymous sources, denied readers an opportunity to evaluate the stories 
and frustrated lawmakers’ inquiries into the merits of the charges.  In 
1894, correspondents for New York and Philadelphia newspapers had 
reported that the “Sugar Trust” tried to secure favorable tariff legislation 
by bribing Senators and contributing to Democratic Party campaigns.86  
A Senate investigating committee referred the reporters for prosecution 
when they refused to identify their sources.87  Some newspapers, notably 
the New York Times, agreed that the reporters should identify their 
sources to assure the public that the story was more than a stratagem to 
embarrass Democrats.88  But the two reporters stood firm.  A grand jury 
indicted them, along with other contumacious witnesses, for violating 
the 1857 contempt of Congress statute.89  The District of Columbia courts 
overruled their demurrers, rejecting claims of a reporter’s privilege, and 
ordered the defendants to plead.90  The reporters ultimately prevailed 
 81. See H.R. REP. NO. 43-268 (2d Sess. 1875). 
 82. See H.R.  REP. NO. 43-262 (2d Sess. 1875). 
 83. See H.R. REP. NO. 44-799 (1st Sess. 1876). 
 84. See H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 44-167 (1st Sess. 1876). 
 85. Gregg found that eleven journalists were called by Congress to testify in the 
1880s and twelve in the 1890s.  Gregg, supra note 25, at 585-86.  Gregg’s count is based 
on “cases reported in official journals . . . .  There may be other unreported cases.”  Id. at 
586.  For details about some of the late nineteenth-century leak investigations, see 
Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 310-66. 
 86. See 26 CONG. REC. 4848-51 (1894); PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, 
supra note 32, at 583-86; Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 340-66. 
 87. See 26 CONG. REC. 5454-55, 5458-59 (1894); PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & 
HOUSE, supra note 32, at 583-86. 
 88. News Sources Not Betrayed, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1894, at 1; Editorial, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 27, 1894, at 4. 
 89. PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, supra note 32, at 828. 
 90. United States v. Seymour (D.C. 1894), in PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & 
HOUSE, supra note 32, at 855-57.  The lower court decisions and the briefs for the 
reporters and other defendants, including some discussion of reporters’ privilege, can be 
found in PRECEDENTS OF THE SENATE & HOUSE, supra note 32, at 797-854.  Considering 
just the demurrer, the Supreme Court denied certiorari for one of the non-reporter 
defendants.  In re Chapman, 156 U.S. 211 (1895).  Two years later the Court ruled on the 
merits of the case, upholding congressional authority to hold witnesses in contempt when 
they refused to cooperate with an investigation.  In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 668 (1897). 
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two years later, however, when a judge found that the testimony sought 
by Congress was not essential to its investigation.91
The nineteenth-century leaks and associated investigations did not 
produce cohesive public policy or free speech rationales behind the use 
of anonymous sources.  One study found that seventy percent of journalists 
complied when called to testify before Congress; forty-one named 
sources and 115 provided other information.92  Sixty-six refused to 
cooperate and some were held in contempt of Congress; of these, eleven 
were confined.93  Journalists who resisted answering questions about 
their sources typically relied on personal honor—they had given their 
word—as the basis for doing so during the first half of the century.94  
Later in the century, in keeping with the emergence of an occupational 
self-consciousness, journalists increasingly relied on professional honor 
as the justification for keeping confidences.95  This rationale sometimes 
included assertions about the importance of confidential sources in 
assuring the flow of information to the public.96  The journalists did not, 
however, rely on freedom of the press in their defense.  In only three 
instances did journalists or their allies even obliquely invoke the First 
Amendment or use language reminiscent of its press clause.97
 91. Unreported decision discussed in The Inviolability of Confidential Communications 
to Newspaper Reporters, 55 ALB. L.J. 430 (1897).  The judge reviewing the indictment 
made a passing reference to the nation’s first state shield law adopted the previous year 
and noted claims about confidentiality in reporters’ work, but declined to recognize an 
evidentiary privilege for journalists.  Id. at 430-31; see also Aaron David Gordon, 
Protection of News Sources: The History and Legal Status of the Newsman’s Privilege 
193-94 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin) (on file with 
the University of Wisconsin Library). 
 92. Gregg, supra note 25, at 526; see also id. at 532-34 (providing reasons why 
most journalists did testify). 
 93. Kaminski found that eleven nineteenth-century journalists—counting twice 
one journalist who was involved in two incidents six years apart—were confined for 
refusing to answer questions as part of congressional leak inquiries.  Correspondents and 
Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 371 & n.6. 
 94. Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 368; Gregg, supra note 
25, at 532. 
 95. Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 368. 
 96. Id.  The public’s right to know argument could also be inverted, as it was by 
some editorialists, to oppose journalistic confidentiality.  Reporters who agreed to testify 
about sources or secret information provided the public with additional details it needed 
to know, especially for stories about corruption in government.  This was a common 
refrain in the editorial responses to Simonton’s 1857 refusal to testify.  See Gregg, supra 
note 25, at 389-92. 
 97. Correspondents and Confidentiality, supra note 25, at 369-85.  Although the 
First Amendment is reflexively invoked in all manner of controversies today, most 




B. Leaks and Reporter-Source Relations in the Administrative State 
The communication strategies of politicians, government officials, 
business leaders, and even social movements shifted with the ascendancy of 
the commercial mass media in the late nineteenth century.98  Individuals 
and groups discovered that successful communication required more 
than issuing their own publications or cooperating with like-minded 
media outlets.  Those seeking to influence public opinion and shape policy 
instead scrambled to get their messages into the commercial mass media, 
and gaining access meant making information newsworthy enough to 
satisfy the demands of professional communicators.99  News—both its 
informational and symbolic content—formed the connective tissue in a 
society where civic decisionmaking was dispersed among branches and 
levels of government, between the private and public sectors, and 
through all manner of associations.100
News leaks figured centrally in this new milieu of political 
communication, especially as reporters and sources renegotiated their 
relationship between the turn of the century and the New Deal.  Unlike 
journalists at the center of nineteenth-century leak investigations, who 
typically wrote as avowedly partisan functionaries,101 the new breed of 
reporters attained significant occupational autonomy, especially those in 
the Washington press corps.  Reporters demonstrated professional success 
through prowess in cultivating sources rather than by advancing a 
doctrines derived from it were crafted after World War I.  The two leading studies of 
nineteenth-century understandings of press freedom do not mention journalists’ 
confidentiality.  See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING 
PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000); 
DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997). 
 98. By the outset of the twentieth century, newspapers increasingly identified 
themselves as business or social institutions rather than as political organs.  They 
appealed to heterogeneous audiences or a class of readers in their market with news 
articles that minimized or sublimated political ideology.  See GERALD J. BALDASTY, THE 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF NEWS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1992). 
 99. See generally James W. Carey, The Communications Revolution and the 
Professional Communicator, in SOC. REV.: MONOGRAPH NO. 13, at 23 (Paul Halmos ed., 
1969) (discussing the emergence of reporters as an occupation that brokers information 
and symbols between the various sectors of society). 
 100. See id.; COOK, supra note 18, at 17-60. 
 101. For excellent discussions of the many ways in which politics and journalism 
insinuated themselves into each other’s realm from the end of the Civil War to the close 
of the century, see generally RICHARD L. KAPLAN, POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN PRESS: 
THE RISE OF OBJECTIVITY, 1865-1920 (2002); SUMMERS, supra note 59.  Quite a few 
Washington correspondents from the Civil War to the early 1900s held patronage 
appointments as clerks of congressional committees.  This supplemented their income as 
writers and gave them easier access to information, including confidential intelligence.  
See RITCHIE, supra note 35, at 62-64, 71-72, 75-77, 98-99, 109, 153, 171-72, 183-84, 
192-94, 206. 
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publisher’s or party’s agenda.102  Sources adjusted to this new environment 
by pursuing two general strategies.  One tack was simply to assist 
reporters’ newsgathering efforts through press offices, press releases, 
press conferences and the like.103  Sources also exploited the values and 
routines of journalists to cultivate favorable coverage.  They carefully 
timed the release of news, played reporters against one another, staged 
newsworthy events, and generally tried to regulate the terms on which 
news flowed to the public.104  The calculated release of information from 
unnamed sources—leaks—thus became one news management tool 
among many in a source’s repertoire. 
Congress and the White House began institutionalizing the techniques 
of modern news management, including news leaks, by the 1890s.  
Lawmakers in the leak-prone Senate discovered that they could 
communicate with constituents in home districts by leaking stories to 
favorite reporters.  The reporters, in return, discovered that editors played up 
such stories over routine news.105  One correspondent who had been the 
target of a leak investigation explained the symbiotic relationship in 1897: 
Members of Congress, of course, have their own particular fortunes to consider, 
and, finding it necessary to use the newspapers for the purpose of reaching the 
ears of their constituents and the voters generally, frequently give reliable 
information of a confidential nature and in advance of general publicity to 
correspondents with whom they desire to be on friendly terms.106
The reporter added that cabinet members also “occasionally ‘leak[ed]’ 
on some live topic of news” when it suited their purposes, but “not 
because they desire[d] to do a favor to the newspaper correspondent and 
through him to the dear public.”107
 102. See generally LEO C. ROSTEN, THE WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENTS (1937) 
(finding that many members of the Washington press corps enjoyed considerable 
autonomy in their work and had closer relations with their sources than with their 
publishers, with whom they often politically disagreed). 
 103. On the emergence of public relations in Progressive Era politics, see COOK, 
supra note 18, at 44-52; STUART EWEN, PR!: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SPIN 39-137 (1996). 
 104. See RITCHIE, supra note 35, at 131-44, 179; Lili Levi, Dangerous Liaisons: 
Seduction and Betrayal in Confidential Press-Source Relations, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 
609, 677-83 (1991). 
 105. See RITCHIE, supra note 35, at 132, 164, 167-68.  An 1890 Senate leak 
investigation, unproductive like most before it, confirmed that lawmakers regularly 
dispensed supposedly secret information to reporters.  Id. at 168-69. 
 106. David S. Barry, News-Getting at the Capital, 26 THE CHAUTAUQUAN, 282, 282 
(1897). 
 107. Id. 




The White House had remained in the shadow of Congress as a news 
making institution for most of the nineteenth century.  But the Spanish-
American War and the administration of Theodore Roosevelt moved the 
presidency onto the journalistic center stage.108  A masterful news maker, 
Roosevelt incorporated leaks into his policymaking maneuvers.109  He floated 
trial balloons to test public reaction to policy options without formally 
committing to them.110  If the response seemed positive, the White House 
embraced the proposal; if negative, the President denied the veracity of a 
report based on unnamed sources.111  Roosevelt also anonymously released 
information that might alienate political allies so they would not hold 
him responsible for the bad news, information that appeared self-serving 
if attributed to the White House, and information that undercut 
congressional opposition to bills he favored.112  “Roosevelt even appreciated 
the nuances in choosing the recipients of leaks.  All things being equal, 
he preferred the stories to appear in opposition newspapers because the 
gambit was less transparent that way.”113  Roosevelt recognized that 
effective political communication depended more on shaping newspapers’ 
front page reports than their editorial columns, a marked departure from 
nineteenth-century political uses of the press.114
Roosevelt and all subsequent Presidents discovered that leaks not 
authorized by the White House subverted their efforts to engineer public 
consent.  For instance, Roosevelt’s unofficial press secretary devoted 
considerable energy to investigating the source of unauthorized leaks.115  
“The President says it looks as if there is a leak in the Department,” the 
aide wrote to cabinet officials, “and he would like to be advised if you 
know how the information got out.”116  Such leaks sprang from various 
executive departments and Roosevelt devoted an entire cabinet meeting 
to discussing the problem.117
 108. See STEPHEN PONDER, MANAGING THE PRESS: ORIGINS OF THE MEDIA PRESIDENCY, 
1897-1933, at 1-15 (1998) (discussing the shift in media attention from Congress to the 
presidency and the growing sophistication of the White House in managing news). 
 109. See GEORGE JUERGENS, NEWS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE: THE PRESIDENTIAL-
PRESS RELATIONSHIP IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1-90 (1981); JOHN TEBBEL & SARAH 
MILES WATTS, THE PRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY: FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO 
RONALD REAGAN 318-48 (1985). 
 110. JUERGENS, supra note 109, at 41-42. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 43-45; ELMER E. CORNWELL, JR., PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP OF PUBLIC 
OPINION 18 (1965). 
 113. JUERGENS, supra note 109, at 44. 
 114. Id. at 5-13. 
 115. See LOUIS W. KOENIG, THE INVISIBLE PRESIDENCY 177 (1960). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.; see also PONDER, supra note 108, at 48 (discussing Roosevelt’s efforts to 
quash unauthorized leaks). 
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Although the unauthorized release of news did little to derail 
Roosevelt’s agenda, his successor found it more than a mere annoyance.  
William Howard Taft, who did not share Roosevelt’s instincts for dealing 
with reporters, sometimes saw his indiscreet private remarks appear in 
published reports attributed to unnamed sources.118  Even more damaging to 
Taft was a 1909 publicity war fought by two administration officials over 
federal conservation policy.119  Officials held over from the Roosevelt 
administration deftly deployed leaks to undermine Taft’s position.120
The role of leaks in both the international and domestic dimensions of 
foreign policymaking became apparent during the administration of 
President Woodrow Wilson.  At first, Wilson enjoyed modest success in 
minimizing negative leaks and maximizing favorable ones.121  After 
World War I, however, leaks gutted his efforts to temper some of the 
harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles and to win domestic approval for 
his international agenda.122  During secret treaty negotiations in Paris, 
the British and especially the French leaked material to their journalists 
in an effort to gain advantages over Wilson at the bargaining table.123  
British Prime Minister Lloyd George even apologized to Wilson for 
particularly embarrassing leaks from his delegation and banished the 
offending diplomat and journalist.124  Perhaps most frustrating for 
Wilson, the leakers aimed to strengthen the hand of Republican Senators 
who opposed his idealistic peacemaking efforts in Europe, and who later 
voted to keep the United States from joining the League of Nations.125  
Partly because of such policy failures and Presidential misstatements, 
Wilson and his two successors in the White House began directing that 
reporters attribute some information to “an official spokesman,” “a 
White House official,” or “a high authority.”126
The explosive growth of the federal government during the New Deal 
and World War II fueled a corresponding expansion in agencies’ public 
 118. See PONDER, supra note 108, at 54. 
 119. Id. at 63-75. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 85-90. 
 122. JUERGENS, supra note 109, at 235-44. 
 123. Id. at 238-41. 
 124. Id. at 236. 
 125. Id. at 239, 262-64. 
 126. SILAS BENT, BALLYHOO: THE VOICE OF THE PRESS 76-81 (1927); CORNWELL, 
supra note 112, at 65; POLLARD, supra note 26, at 716; ROSTEN, supra note 102, at 24-25. 




information efforts and in the size of the Washington press corps.127  
Leaks to the press flourished in this environment as a way to inform and 
persuade the public about increasingly complex public affairs.  Franklin 
Roosevelt skillfully deployed leaks as part of his administration’s well-
orchestrated multichannel communication campaigns.128  This controlled, 
strategic news release exemplified how a modern ethos of reporter-
source relations supplanted the rules that had governed nineteenth-century 
partisan journalism.  By the mid-twentieth century, leaks had become 
a transaction in which reporters and sources each derived advantages 
regardless of their partisan inclinations.  Like his distant cousin 
Theodore, Franklin Roosevelt often leaked to papers that editorially 
opposed his policies in order to heighten the credibility of the anonymous 
communication.129  For their part, reporters welcomed leaks regardless 
of their political opinions about a source because doing so boosted their 
standing as enterprising newsgatherers. 
Even in security conscious Washington during World War II, leaks 
sprang from all manner of institutions to enrich political communication 
among elites while informing the public.  Leaks had become “essential 
to the operation of the democracy in these complex times,” according to 
government administrator and later Civil War historian Bruce Catton.130
[I]t is through the leak that the people are kept in touch with their 
government. . . . It is the leak which enables them to know whether the fine 
boasts and pretensions of an appointed person are really justified.  It is the 
leak—telling them what may happen, what is being planned, what the carefully 
hidden facts actually are—which makes it possible for them to react while there 
is still time and thus exert an influence on the handling of affairs.131
Although leaking was “frequently misused by self-seekers and schemers” 
and often made officials look inefficient, “our particular form of 
government wouldn’t work without it.”132
 127. See JAMES L. MCCAMY, GOVERNMENT PUBLICITY: ITS PRACTICE IN FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATION (1939); RICHARD W. STEELE, PROPAGANDA IN AN OPEN SOCIETY: THE 
ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION AND THE MEDIA, 1933-1941 (1985). 
 128. The best discussion of Franklin Roosevelt’s press relations is BETTY HOUCHIN 
WINFIELD, FDR AND THE NEWS MEDIA (1990).  For examples of Roosevelt’s use of leaks 
for a variety of political and policy purposes, see id. at 66, 133, 142-43. 
 129. DONALD A. RITCHIE, REPORTING FROM WASHINGTON: THE HISTORY OF THE 
WASHINGTON PRESS CORPS 10 (2005). 
 130. BRUCE CATTON, THE WAR LORDS OF WASHINGTON 89 (1948). 
 131. Id. at 87. 
 132. Id. 
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III.  THE MARGINAL PROTECTION FOR LEAKS AFFORDED BY 
JOURNALISTS’ CONFIDENTIALITY LAW 
The facts in Branzburg v. Hayes,133 the Supreme Court’s seminal 
analysis of journalists’ asserted constitutional privilege, had nothing to 
do with leaks of government information.  The Court synthesized its 
decision from a modest body of law that had been developing since the 
late 1800s, which also never significantly addressed the importance of 
political or policy leaks.  Nonetheless, as the Court’s only ruling dealing 
centrally with journalists’ privilege,134 this 1972 decision often proves 
decisive when leaks raise questions about confidentiality law. 
A. Pre-Branzburg Confidentiality Law and Leaks 
The major legal principles governing confidentiality developed from 
the common law, statutes, and constitutional interpretation, with only 
occasional glances at the special role that leaks play in governance.  
Protecting the confidentiality of leakers nevertheless found some support 
at the margins of the law. 
1. Mainstream Developments in Confidentiality Law 
Confidentiality disputes arising from contexts other than congressional 
investigations began reaching the courts in the late 1880s.  Most reported 
decisions stemmed from one of three situations: when reporters refused 
to provide prosecutors with information or the identity of sources used in 
writing stories about criminal activities,  identify sources for articles 
that breached the secrecy or challenged the integrity of grand jury 
proceedings,  or disclose sources sought by plaintiffs in libel suits
135
136 .137  
 133. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 134. DIENES, LEVINE & LIND, supra note 3, at 917, 930. 
 135. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1970); 
People v. Durrant, 48 P. 75, 86 (Cal. 1897); Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950); 
State v. Donovan, 30 A.2d 421 (N.J. 1943). 
 136. See, e.g., Joslyn v. People, 184 P. 375 (Colo. 1919); People ex rel. Mooney v. 
Sheriff of New York County, 199 N.E. 415 (N.Y. 1936). 
 137. See, e.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 
910 (1958); Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957); 
Pledger v. State, 3 S.E. 320 (Ga. 1887); Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 123 A.2d 473 
(N.J. 1956); Clinton v. Commercial Tribune Co., 8 Ohio N.P. 655 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1901);   
see also, e.g., In re Goodfader’s Appeal, 367 P.2d 472 (Haw. 1961) (seeking journalist’s 
testimony for a suit challenging the firing of a public employee). 




Reported cases invariably held that, absent statutory protection, the 
common law did not recognize a testimonial privilege for the press.138  
In rejecting journalists’ claims, courts and commentators frequently 
invoked Wigmore’s admonition against any expansion of testimonial 
privileges.139
The most important pre-Branzburg confidentiality case testing 
journalists’ constitutional claims arose from a 1965 libel action involving 
celebrity gossip, a situation far removed from the typical government 
leak case.  In Garland v. Torre,140 columnist Marie Torre published 
critical remarks about singer Judy Garland’s physical appearance and 
performance attributed to an unnamed television executive.141  To advance 
her libel suit, Garland sought the identity of the unnamed source.  Torre 
refused, relying principally on a constitutional argument that compelling 
testimony “would impose an important practical restraint on the flow of 
news from news sources to news media and would thus diminish pro 
tanto the flow of news to the public.”142  The appellate court opinion by 
Judge Potter Stewart, written shortly before he joined the Supreme 
Court, acknowledged that forced disclosure had First Amendment 
implications and could indeed compromise newsgathering.143  But 
because the source’s identity went to the heart of the libel claim and 
could not be discovered by alternative means, the court found that “the 
interest to be served by compelling the testimony of the witness . . . 
justifies some impairment of this First Amendment freedom.”144
Journalists fared better in some state legislatures, winning passage of 
shield laws that established a basis for refusing to testify in many 
circumstances.  Maryland adopted the first shield law in 1896,145 and a 
 138. “In the view of the reported cases, no testimonial privilege exists, save in those 
twelve states where such a privilege is specifically set out by statute.”  W. D. Lorensen, 
Note, The Journalist and His Confidential Source: Should a Testimonial Privilege Be 
Allowed?, 35 NEB. L. REV. 562, 562 (1956).  The Supreme Court reached the same 
conclusion seventeen years later.  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 685 (1972) (“At 
common law, courts consistently refused to recognize the existence of any privilege 
authorizing a newsman to refuse to reveal confidential information to a grand jury.”). 
 139. See, e.g., Donovan, 30 A.2d at 426 (citing 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2286 (3d 
ed. 1940)) (criticizing journalists’ shield laws to justify why New Jersey’s statute should 
be construed narrowly in this case).  For two examples of how Wigmore dominated legal 
thinking about the merits of journalists’ confidentiality, see Lorensen, supra note 138, at 
563; LeGrand C. Tibbits, Note, Privilege of a Newspaper Reporter to Refuse to Testify 
Concerning Information Confidentially Received, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 115, 116-18 (1936). 
 140. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958). 
 141. MARIE TORRE, DON’T QUOTE ME 34-37 (1965). 
 142. Garland, 259 F.2d at 547-48 (quoting Appellant’s Brief). 
 143. Id. at 548-49. 
 144. Id. at 548; see Comment, Confidentiality of News Sources Under the First 
Amendment, 11 STAN. L. REV. 541 (1959). 
 145. David Gordon, The 1896 Maryland Shield Law: The American Roots of 
Evidentiary Privilege for Newsmen, JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS, No. 22 (1972). 
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widely publicized 1936 New York confidentiality case mobilized press 
associations to lobby for similar laws elsewhere.146  By the time 
Branzburg reached the Supreme Court, seventeen states had granted 
journalists an evidentiary privilege through statute.147  Several times 
between 1929 and 1972 Congress also considered the privilege, but 
stopped short of enacting a federal shield law.148
2. Protection for Leaks on the Margins 
Some pre-Branzburg legal actions involving leaks did favor the press, 
though they had limited precedential value.  Most notably, by 1970 the 
majority of state shield laws afforded special protection to journalists’ 
sources as distinct from the contents of their confidential communications.149  
For instance, Alabama’s absolute protection for source identity prevented a 
libel plaintiff from compelling a journalist to name officials in the state 
prison system who had leaked information about abuses over a number 
of years.150
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination provided more 
oblique protection for leaks.  The Supreme Court in 1914 upheld a 
journalist’s claim that compelled testimony might violate his right 
against self-incrimination.151  A city editor who had written articles 
about customs fraud refused to reveal his sources to a federal grand jury 
 146. People ex. rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, 199 N.E. 415 (N.Y. 
1936); see also Walter A. Steigleman, Newspaper Confidence Laws—Their Extent and 
Provisions, 20 JOURNALISM Q. 230, 233-34 (1943).  This case also prompted the first 
flurry of law review commentaries on journalists’ privilege.  See, e.g., Recent Case, Duty 
of Reporter to Disclose Name of Informer, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 680 (1935); Albert D. Nohr, 
Recent Case, People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 199 N.E. (N.Y. 1936), 11 WIS. L. REV. 
576 (1936); Note, Privilege of Newspapermen to Withhold Sources of Information from 
the Court, 45 YALE L.J. 357 (1935). 
 147. DIENES, LEVINE & LIND, supra note 3, at 912-13, n.20. 
 148. See N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM’N, LEG. DOC. NO. 65(A): REP. & STUDY 
RELATING TO PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN CONFERRING UPON NEWSPAPERMEN A PRIVILEGE 
WHICH WOULD LEGALLY PROTECT THEM FROM DIVULGING SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
GIVEN TO THEM 38-73 (1949) (reprinting all the bills introduced into Congress between 
1929 and 1943); MAURICE VAN GERPEN, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND THE PRESS 
29-57, 127 (1979) (listing shield bills introduced before 1975). 
 149. See Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a 
Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 321 (1970) (detailing the statutory 
privileges shielding the identities of journalists’ informants available in some states on 
the eve of Branzburg). 
 150. Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351, 352 (N.D. Ala. 1953) (relying on ALA. CODE 
tit. 7, § 370 (1940)). 
 151. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94 (1915). 




on the grounds that he might incriminate himself.152  President Wilson 
granted him a pardon, and he was held in contempt when he still refused 
to testify.153  The Supreme Court recognized the editor’s right to decline 
the pardon, and thereby avoid testifying, in an opinion criticized for 
opening a backdoor to journalists’ confidentiality.154  In later cases, 
prosecutors simply offered reporters immunity to circumvent their Fifth 
Amendment claims.155
Unreported decisions, which comprise the majority of pre-Branzburg 
confidentiality cases,156 furnished support for protecting source identities 
in stories based on leaks.  For instance, reporters who wrote about 
misconduct and graft in state agencies sometimes rebuffed efforts to 
uncover their sources.157  When a reporter for the Nashville Tennesseean 
refused in 1948 to reveal his sources for a story about police officers 
aiding bootleggers, the judge accepted a claim of journalists’ privilege 
for stories exposing wrongdoing in government.158  The judge concluded 
that the press necessarily receives much information given in confidence.  “I 
am unable to hold the witness in contempt on this matter.  It’s true it is 
hard to have serious charges made against a public official on hearsay 
evidence, but at times much good has been done in this way.”159
Congress similarly and repeatedly stopped short of forcing reporters to 
identify sources for stories based on leaks in the decades before 
Branzburg.  Lawmakers often sympathized with journalists’ confidentiality 
 152. Id. at 85; see also RICHARD KLUGER, THE PAPER: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE 
NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE 187-89 (1986) (discussing the case from the newspaper’s 
perspective). 
 153. Burdick, 236 U.S. at 85-86. 
 154. See 2 CHAFEE, supra note 18, at 498 (“He got all the practical advantage of a 
special newspaper privilege by dressing himself up in the United States Constitution.”); 
Note, Effect of an Unaccepted Pardon upon the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 28 
HARV. L. REV. 609 (1915). 
 155. In Branzburg, the Court noted that prosecutors sometimes offered immunity to 
reporters who invoked their right against self-incrimination as the basis for refusing to 
testify.  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 702 n.39 (1972). 
 156. “It should be noted that the great majority of cases on this subject are 
unreported.”  Note, The Right of a Newsman to Refrain from Divulging the Sources of 
His Information, 36 VA. L. REV. 61, 61 n.3 (1950). 
 157. For example, a reporter refused to identify his sources for a story about the 
Pennsylvania liquor board’s violations of procedures in issuing a license.  See Right to 
Withhold News Source Upheld, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Dec. 9, 1933, at 16.  A year later 
another reporter rebuffed attempts to uncover his sources for a story about graft at the 
Illinois Emergency Relief Commission.  See Chicago Court Defers Contempt Ruling, 
EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 4, 1934, at 1; Court Drops Sloan Contempt Charge, EDITOR 
& PUBLISHER, Aug. 11, 1934, at 10; Judge Backs Chicago Reporter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 
1934, at 13; Sloan Case Based on Legal Myths, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 11, 1934, at 
11. 
 158. Court Upholds Press on Shielding Source, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1948, at 25; 
Judge Frees Reporter, Then Adds Praise, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, June 5, 1948, at 64. 
 159. Court Upholds Press on Shielding Source, supra note 158, at 25. 
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claims.  In one instance, a reporter’s account of shortcomings in Veterans 
Administration hospitals, based on information from unnamed officials, 
triggered a 1945 congressional investigation.160  Citing professional 
ethics, the reporter refused to reveal his sources.161  Committee members 
initially voted to hold him in contempt but reversed their decision after 
hearing from a number of colleagues.162  “To compel a member of the 
newspaper profession to expose the source of his information would, in 
many instances revolt against the public good,” one representative told 
the House.163  Nearly twenty years later, columnist Jack Anderson 
refused to identify sources who told him that members of Congress 
cheated on payrolls and expense accounts, but the investigating 
committee accepted his assertion that “reporters had a constitutional 
right to protect their sources.”164
Other investigatory bodies also backed down when reporters refused 
to reveal their sources.  In 1955, a Washington Post reporter declined to 
tell the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) who leaked information 
 160. See Investigation of the Veterans’ Administration with a Particular View to 
Determining the Efficiency of the Administration and Operation of Veterans’ 
Administration Facilities: Hearings on H.R. Res. 192 Before the H. Comm. on World 
War Veterans’ Legislation, pt. 1, 79th Cong. 165, 171 (1945) [hereinafter Investigation 
of the Veterans’ Administration]; House Body Defers News Source Vote, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 23, 1945, at 17; Charles Hurd, The Veteran, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1945, at 21; Story 
of Beating of Veterans Waits, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1945, at 20. 
 161. See Investigation of the Veterans’ Administration, supra note 160, at 171 
(testimony of Albert Deutsch, reporter for the newspaper PM). 
 162. Id. at 172, 182-83, 342; 91 CONG. REC. 4847, 4859, App. 2554 (1945) 
(remarks of Reps. Kopplemann, O’Toole, and Biemiller, all speaking in favor of 
respecting the reporter’s confidentiality). 
 163. 91 CONG. REC. 4859 (1945) (remarks of Rep. O’Toole).  In another 1940s 
incident with a similar outcome, a House committee investigating labor disruptions in 
Pacific combat areas ordered a newspaper editor to identify the sources for his story.  
Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Naval Affairs of Sundry Legislation Affecting the 
Naval Establishment: Hearings before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Naval Affairs 
No. 30, 78th Cong. 197 (1944).  When the editor refused, the committee backed down, 
noting that having the names “would have been helpful . . . .  We are aware, however, of 
the customary practice of newspapers in not revealing the sources of such stories.”  Id. at 
199. 
 164. See List of ‘Cheaters’ Spurned in House, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1963, at 22; see 
also JACK ANDERSON, WASHINGTON EXPOSE 44-45 (1967) (asserting that Congress did 
not want him to reveal too many details about congressional corruption).  In another 
congressional investigation the same year, a reporter refused to disclose his sources for a 
story that raised questions about the fairness of the Pentagon’s procedures for letting 
contracts.  Reporter Refuses to Tell Senate Who Gave Him Data on the TFX, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 25, 1963, at 6. 




from the National Security Council (NSC).165  The FBI dropped the 
matter when the reporter assured agents that he had not seen actual NSC 
documents.166  In another instance, a series of articles for the Arizona 
Republic about corruption at two state commissions prompted grand jury 
and legislative investigations; the reporter successfully resisted efforts to 
learn who had leaked key information.167
B. Branzburg v. Hayes 
When the question of journalists’ confidentiality reached the Supreme 
Court in 1972, the contours of the law were clear.  The First Amendment 
furnished weak support at best, the common law resisted efforts to 
recognize evidentiary privileges, and state shield laws provided varying 
degrees of protection.168  Furthermore, confidentiality law made no 
distinction between cases involving leaks from government and those 
where journalists had witnessed crimes or had defamed someone using 
unnamed sources.  Unreported cases and congressional actions that 
exhibited sympathy for journalists’ claims in situations involving leaks 
carried little precedential weight. 
The four cases consolidated in Branzburg v. Hayes grew out of 
governmental attempts to exploit the media’s information gathering 
activities for its own criminal investigations of counterculture and 
dissident political activities.169  Possibly hundreds of subpoenas were 
issued to news organizations in the late 1960s to identify sources or turn 
over information about the Black Panther Party, Students for a 
Democratic Society, drug use, anti-Vietnam War organizing, and 
kindred activities.170  In two of the cases that ended up at the Supreme 
Court, reporter Paul Branzburg declined to testify before a grand jury 
about illicit drug activities he had witnessed while preparing an article 
 165. CHALMERS M. ROBERTS, FIRST ROUGH DRAFT: A JOURNALIST’S JOURNAL OF 
OUR TIMES 125-26 (1973); James Reston, Reporter Is Queried on Security ‘Leaks,’ N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 7, 1955 at 1. 
 166. ROBERTS, supra note 165, at 125; Reston, supra note 165, at 1, 63. 
 167. Jack Langguth, Arizona Presses Bribery Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1964, at 
75; Jack Langguth, 4th Arizona Aide Will Go on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1964, at 18. 
 168. The state of journalists’ confidentiality law on the eve of Branzburg is 
conveniently summarized in DIENES, LEVINE & LIND, supra note 3, at 910-13. 
 169. “Government prosecutors and legislators actively sought the assistance, 
voluntary or otherwise, of reporters who had established valuable confidential contacts 
with the leaders and rank-and-file members of these ‘subversive’ groups.” John E. 
Osborn, The Reporter’s Confidentiality Privilege: Updating the Empirical Evidence 
After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 60 (1985); see also VAN 
GERPEN, supra note 148, at 29-57 (discussing subpoenas issued to the press as part of the 
government’s investigation of the counterculture). 
 170. See Sherwood, supra note 12, at 1202; see also Osborn, supra note 169, at 59-
61; Note, supra note 149, at 317. 
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for the Louisville Courier-Journal.171  Both of the other appeals considered 
in Branzburg involved reporters’ refusals to testify before grand juries 
investigating the Black Panther Party’s possible criminal activities.172
Of the four cases, United States v. Caldwell presented the strongest 
claim for recognizing journalists’ confidentiality,173 and it was the only 
one in which the press prevailed in the lower courts.  New York Times 
reporter Earl Caldwell testified that he was among the few journalists 
working for the mainstream media who had successfully cultivated 
sources in the Black Panther Party.174  Caldwell claimed that vital 
sources would refuse to deal with him once he stepped inside the grand 
jury room.175  Affidavits from prominent journalists supported his 
assertion about the value of confidential sources.176  Despite the district 
court’s willingness to issue a protective order shielding Caldwell’s 
“confidential associations, sources or information received,” the New 
York Times reporter still refused to appear and was held in contempt.177  
The appeals court vacated the contempt citation, recognizing that the 
“public’s First Amendment right to be informed” conferred a qualified 
constitutional right on the press to refuse to testify.178
The Supreme Court disagreed.  Although the majority conceded that 
compelling journalists to testify imposed some burden on newsgathering, 
“the evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a significant 
constriction of the flow of news to the public if this Court reaffirms the 
prior common-law and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial 
obligations of newsmen.”179  Looking beyond the cases at hand, Justice 
 171. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 345-46 (Ky. 1970), aff’d sub nom., 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748, 749 
(Ky. 1971), aff’d sub nom., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 172. In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971), aff’d sub nom., Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); In re Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev’d, 
Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev’d sub nom., Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 173. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). 
 174. Id. at 1087 n.7 (reprinting testimony from Caldwell); see also Newsmen’s 
Privilege: Hearings on H.R. 717 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 39-43 (1973) (statement of Earl Caldwell about the problems he 
faced in reporting on the Black Panthers and the complications caused by the 
government’s efforts to use him as a source of information about the Party) [hereinafter 
1973 House Hearings]. 
 175. Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1088 n.7. 
 176. Id. at 1084. 
 177. Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. at 362; Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1081. 
 178. Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1089. 
 179. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972). 




White observed that “from the beginning of our country the press has 
operated without constitutional protection for press informants, and the 
press has flourished.”180  The interests of the press thus must yield to the 
“longstanding principle that the ‘public . . . has a right to every man’s 
evidence,’” especially for grand jury proceedings.181
Despite the majority’s holding, several aspects of the Court’s decision 
held open the possibility of recognizing some claims to protect 
confidentiality, perhaps including those involving leaks.  First, the opinion 
twice acknowledged that “news gathering is not without its First 
Amendment protections.”182  Second, the four cases decided in Branzburg 
all involved efforts to compel testimony before grand juries.  Indeed, the 
Court repeatedly framed its analysis in terms of its import for grand 
juries, suggesting a limitation on its reach, and many lower courts 
interpreted it accordingly.183  Third, the majority opinion focused on 
confidentiality in cases dealing with criminal activity; nowhere did it 
address confidentiality in connection with leaks from government.184
The concurring and dissenting opinions furnish additional support for 
construing Branzburg narrowly enough to protect the confidentiality of 
leaks from government sources.  Providing the majority’s necessary fifth 
vote, Justice Powell’s concurring opinion emphasized “the limited 
nature of the Court’s holding.”185  He underscored the importance of 
striking a balance between “the obligation of all citizens to give relevant 
testimony” and the interests of the press “on a case-by-case basis.”186  
This single passage “has formed the cornerstone of much subsequent 
constitutional law on the subject,” according to one treatise.187
Justice Stewart’s dissent also exerted unusual influence on subsequent 
developments.  The three-part test he fashioned has been followed by many 
 180. Id. at 698-99. 
 181. Id. at 688 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)). 
 182. Id. at 681, 707.  But the Court held that the compelled testimony at issue here 
imposed an incidental burden on the press and not a “prior restraint or restriction on what 
the press may publish.”  Id. at 681. 
 183. “The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury 
subpoenas . . . .”  Id. at 682; see also id. at 687-88, 701-02 (addressing assertions of 
journalists’ confidentiality in a grand jury context).  Absent statutory protection, courts 
considering the scope of a common law or constitutional privilege have been most 
reluctant to recognize it when journalists have been called to testify before a grand jury.  
See DIENES, LEVINE & LIND, supra note 3, at 1066-69. 
 184. In reciting the facts presented by the three cases, the Court emphasized the 
journalists’ knowledge of other parties’ possible criminal activity.  See Branzburg, 408 
U.S. at 667-79. 
 185. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 186. Id. at 710. 
 187. DIENES, LEVINE & LIND, supra note 3, at 926. 
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lower courts and mirrors the elements of most shield laws.188  Believing 
that the “right to gather news” implied “a right to a confidential relationship 
between a reporter and his source,” Stewart shifted the presumption in 
favor of the press.189  Before forcing disclosure, he would require the 
government to prove that a journalist has relevant information, not 
obtainable by alternative means, for which there is a “compelling and 
overriding interest.”190  In a separate dissent, Justice Douglas recognized 
an absolute right for journalists to maintain their confidences.191  In an 
observation with special import for leaks, Douglas praised the role of 
journalistic confidentiality in exposing government’s inner workings to 
public scrutiny.192
C. Confidentiality Law and Leaks from Branzburg to the CIA Leak Case 
The press pursued two strategies in the wake of the Court’s Branzburg 
decision.  In the short term, journalists pushed for more shield laws, 
especially at the federal level.193  The effort fell short in Congress but 
presented an opportunity for the press to articulate the importance of 
protecting confidences in reporting on government.  In the longer term, 
and with considerable success, the press and its legal advocates argued 
that courts should use the three-part test from Stewart’s dissenting 
opinion in deciding confidentiality cases.194  This approach provided 
considerable protection for a wide range of cases, but it did little to 
recognize leaks as a form of political communication. 
1. Leaks and the Campaign for a Federal Shield Law 
Though it declined to recognize journalists’ First Amendment 
confidentiality claims, the Branzburg majority invited Congress and the 
 188. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  “The Stewart approach now 
governs much of the law of journalist’s privilege in the context of civil and criminal 
proceedings.  The three-part test of Stewart’s Branzburg dissent has thus become enormously 
important.”  DONALD M. GILLMOR, ET AL., MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 363 (5th ed. 1990). 
 189. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 728. 
 190. Id. at 743. 
 191. Id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 192. Id. at 722. 
 193. See VAN GERPEN, supra note 148, at 147-70 (reviewing efforts to secure a 
shield law in Congress). 
 194. See Lawrence J. Mullen, Comment, Developments in the News Media 
Privilege: The Qualified Constitutional Approach Becoming Common Law, 33 ME. L. 
REV. 401, 419 (1981). 




states to extend a statutory privilege to the press.195  One day after the 
ruling, a Senator introduced the first of dozens of bills considered by 
Congress through the mid-1970s to protect journalists’ sources and 
confidential information.196  The congressional hearings focused, at most, 
modest attention on the importance of news leaks from government 
sources.197  In arguing for the merits of shield legislation, the press and 
its allies highlighted a few examples of stories developed through 
unnamed sources that exposed government malfeasance.198  More than 
one shield law proponent pointed to a recent exposé by the Memphis 
Commercial Appeal about problems in state hospitals as illustrating the 
need to protect journalists’ confidentiality.199  Witnesses complained that 
state authorities devoted more energy to seeking the leak’s source than 
addressing the problems.200  Witnesses also mentioned, but did not 
explore, the importance of protecting source confidentiality in making 
the Pentagon Papers public and in bringing the still unfolding Watergate 
scandal to light.201  More frequently, those testifying on behalf of the shield 
bills cited examples like those addressed in Branzburg—compelling 
 195. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706 (majority opinion). 
 196. Senator Alan Cranston of California, a former wire service reporter, introduced 
the bill immediately after the Branzburg decision.  See VAN GERPEN, supra note 148, at 
149; see also Newsmen’s Privilege: Hearings on S. 36, S. 158, S. 318, S. 451, S. 637, S. 
750, S. 870, S. 917, S. 1128, and S.J. Res. 8 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 45-59 (1973) (remarks of Sen. 
Cranston); 1973 House Hearings, supra note 174, at 256-64 (testimony of Arthur B. 
Hanson, General Counsel, American Newspaper Publishers Association and secretary 
for an ad hoc committee of media groups pushing for a federal shield law) (analyzing 
differences among the various proposals for a shield law); VAN GERPEN, supra note 148, 
at 147-70 (reviewing the failed efforts to pass a federal shield statute in the wake of 
Branzburg). 
 197. For instance, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, citing research 
by law professor Vince Blasi, noted that “stories of Government operations involve the 
heaviest use of promises of confidentiality with something over one-third of the stories 
written said to have been affected by promises of confidentiality.”  1973 House 
Hearings, supra note 174, at 12 (remarks of Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr.); see Vince Blasi, 
The Newsman’s Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229, 251-53 (1971). 
 198. See, e.g., Newsmen’s Privilege: Hearings on H.R. 837, 1084, 15891, 15972, 
16527, 16713 and 16542 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d 
Cong. 177-79 (remarks of Sen. Cranston), 218-19 (testimony of Richard Oliver of the 
New York Daily News) (1972) [hereinafter 1972 House Hearings]; 1973 House 
Hearings, supra note 174, at 61 (testimony on behalf of the Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press), 240 (remarks of A. M. Rosenthal, managing editor, New York 
Times). 
 199. See, e.g., 1972 House Hearings, supra note 198, at 64 (statement of Guy Ryan, 
president, Sigma Delta Chi, a professional organization of journalists), 195-97 (remarks 
of Rep. Dan Kuykendall of Tennessee). 
 200. Id. 
 201. See, e.g., id. at 172-73 (testimony of Rep. Edward I. Koch of New York 
mentioning the Pentagon Papers); 1973 House Hearings, supra note 174, at 67 
(statement of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press mentioning Watergate). 
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reporters to testify about possible criminal activity they witnessed.202  
They also focused on the ever-growing number of subpoenas served on 
photographers and television journalists for visual evidence sought by 
law enforcement.203
The few opponents of shield laws who testified during the congressional 
hearings downplayed the need for a federal statute and ignored the 
importance of protecting leaks.204  The Department of Justice, represented 
by Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia, reassured reporters that 
its guidelines for subpoenaing the press guarded against abuses.205  The 
guidelines had been issued in August 1970, drafted with the help of 
William Rehnquist, head of the Office of Legal Counsel before joining 
the Court.206  In presenting the case against a federal shield law, Scalia 
offered hypothetical situations in which the media’s insistence on 
maintaining confidentiality could cause grave harm.207  The parade of 
horrors included reporters who refused to turn over a kidnapper’s 
ransom note or a message about a bomber’s threats, television stations 
that refused to supply video outtakes needed to investigate demonstrations 
or “the attempted assassination of a prominent political figure,” 
newspapers that refused to identify the source of illegally released secret 
grand jury testimony that “irreparably injur[ed] the reputation of a 
prominent individual” who may never be indicted, and reporters who 
refused to identify the source from which they obtained properly 
classified national defense secrets.208
 202. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 174, at 65-68 (statement of the 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press listing post-Branzburg clashes between 
prosecutors and the press over confidential sources and information). 
 203. Id. 
 204. “With the sole exception of the Department of Justice, witnesses at the [1972 
House] hearings, comprising Members of Congress and representatives of organizations, 
and so forth, favored some form of privilege.”  1973 House Hearings, supra note 174, at 
1 (remarks of Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier of Wisconsin). 
 205. See Newsmen’s Privilege: Hearings on H.R. 215 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 6-15 (testimony of Scalia) (1975) [hereinafter 1975 House 
Hearings].  The Justice Department guidelines, announced August 10, 1970, are 
reprinted in 1972 House Hearings, supra note 198, at 28-29 (current version at 28 C.F.R. 
§ 50.10 (2005)). 
 206. See Lawrence R. Velvel, The Supreme Court Stops the Presses, 22 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 324, 341-42 (1973) (arguing that Rehnquist should have recused himself in 
Branzburg because he had recently participated in shaping the administration’s policy on 
subpoenaing reporters). 
 207. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 205, at 7. 
 208. Id. 




In the end, no shield bill made much headway in Congress in the years 
immediately after Branzburg.  Disagreements among different segments 
of the media over the features of a federal shield law undermined the 
legislative campaign.209  Initially, much of the press seemed willing to 
support a qualified privilege along the lines of Stewart’s three-prong 
test.210  But as subpoenas to reporters continued to proliferate, even in 
states with shield laws, reporters’ groups increasingly pushed for 
unqualified protections.211  The media also divided over who (student 
journalists, freelance writers, book authors, photographers, scholars) 
should enjoy the protection of a shield law, whether a law should apply 
to just federal proceedings or also extend to the states, and other 
issues.212  Thus, Congress never came close to a floor vote on federal 
shield legislation in the 1970s,213 though several states enacted protections 
following the Branzburg decision and several others modified existing 
statutes.214
2. Confidentiality Cases and Leaks, 1972-2005 
Post-Branzburg confidentiality rulings did not treat unidentified 
government sources differently than other types of journalistic informants.215  
 209. See VAN GERPEN, supra note 148, at 166-69; AM. SOC’Y OF NEWSPAPER 
EDITORS, PROBLEMS OF JOURNALISM 178-98 (1973). 
 210. See, e.g., 1972 House Hearings, supra note 198, at 42 (statement of the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors), 55 (Associated Press Managing Editors), 61 
(Radio Television News Directors Association), 75 (American Newspaper Publishers 
Association); VAN GERPEN, supra note 148, at 149. 
 211. See, e.g., 1973 House Hearings, supra note 174, at 58, 60, 65-68 (Reporters 
Committee), 256 (American Newspaper Publishers Association).  In fact, discussions 
about shield legislation revealed growing fissures between reporters on the one hand and 
editors and publishers on the other.  The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 
which had been formed in 1970 to fight Nixon administration subpoenas, emerged 
as and remains the leading advocacy group for reporters, especially when their interests 
diverge from those of editors and media owners.  See Floyd J. McKay, First Amendment 
Guerillas: Formative Years of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 6 
JOURNALISM & COMM. MONOGRAPHS 105 (2004). 
 212. VAN GERPEN, supra note 148, at 150-55, summarizes the debate over which 
types of communicators should qualify for the privilege under the proposed federal 
shield laws. 
 213. Apparently only one bill was even reported out of committee.  See id. at 169. 
 214. Between 1973 and 1975 eight states passed shield laws, others modified theirs, 
and some considered but rejected a statutory privilege.  See id. at 127-28, 202 n.1. 
 215. Except for a one paragraph discussion of the general contours of confidentiality 
law, infra text accompanying notes 216-19, this section focuses on cases in which the 
identity of a government source was at issue—that is, cases involving leaks, as defined 
supra note 1.  This subset of all journalists’ confidentiality cases was constructed from 
the Media Law Reporter, which provides more complete coverage for this topic than 
other reporters.  Nonetheless, there is no easy way to quantify how many confidentiality 
cases involve government sources.  Indeed, given the nature of this issue—unnamed 
sources—it was not entirely clear in a handful of cases in state courts whether the 
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Courts weighed the customary media claim that forcing disclosure could 
dry up sources and ultimately diminish the flow of information to the 
public, but the implications for governance received scant attention.  
Except when a state shield law dictated a different outcome, decisions in 
confidentiality cases typically applied elements from Stewart’s test or 
some variant of them.216  Stewart’s test required the government to prove 
that a journalist had relevant information, not otherwise obtainable, for 
which there was a compelling interest.  In terms of relevance, courts 
frowned on fishing expeditions by parties merely hoping to discover 
useful evidence in the hands of a reporter.217  Courts also preferred that 
parties seeking to breach journalistic confidentiality exhaust other 
sources first or at least make a good faith effort to develop the same 
information through other channels.218  Courts assessed the compelling 
need for the information largely by assigning varying weight to different 
legal contexts for which the evidence was sought, whether criminal, 
civil, libel, or grand jury.219
Courts usually protected the confidentiality of a reporter’s government 
sources when their identity was sought to advance a civil suit.220  For 
instance, one cluster of confidentiality cases stemmed from actions by 
city, county, or state employees against an agency that had fired or 
otherwise punished them; courts rarely compelled reporters to identify 
government sources sought for such suits.221  Similarly, demands that 
sources were in fact individuals in government.  In such situations, contextual clues were 
used to include or exclude them from the analysis. 
 216. See GILLMOR ET AL., supra note 188, at 363. 
 217. See DIENES, LEVINE & LIND, supra note 3, at 1009-10 (discussing the relevance 
requirement recognized in shield laws and in some constitutional and common law 
interpretations of a journalist’s privilege). 
 218. See id. at 1010-13 (discussing the exhaustion requirement). 
 219. See id. at 1066-89 (discussing confidentiality claims in different proceedings). 
 220. See, e.g, Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (declining to compel a 
newspaper to identify, for purposes of a civil suit, a government source who leaked 
transcripts of wiretaps made in an organized crime investigation). 
 221. See, e.g., In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1983); Green v. Office of the 
Sheriff, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1756 (M.D. Fla. 2002); McKee v. Starkville, 11 Media 
L. Rep. (BNA) 2312 (N.D. Miss. 1985); Whitney v. O’Hara, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 
1607 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Connecticut Labor Relations Bd. v. Fagin, 370 A.2d 1095 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1976); Miller v. Greer, 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1061 (Ga. Super. Ct. 
1992); Waterloo/Cedar Falls Courier v. Hawkeye Cmty. Coll., 646 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa 
2002); Wojcik v. Boston Herald Inc., 803 N.E.2d 1261 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004); Sinnott v. 
Boston Ret. Bd., 524 N.E.2d 100 (Mass. 1988).  But see Trautman v. Dallas Sch. Dist., 8 
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1088 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (holding a reporter in contempt for 




reporters identify their government sources in civil suits against the IRS 
for leaking information about taxpayers’ records have also been largely 
unsuccessful.222  But in one long-running case, courts recently held five 
reporters in contempt for refusing to identify sources sought by a 
plaintiff suing federal agencies for violating the Privacy Act.223  The appeals 
court found that ordering disclosure was the only way the plaintiff could 
prove essential elements of his claim.224
Libel suits confounded the usual application of confidentiality 
principles in civil actions.225  A federal appeals court noted that “[w]hen 
the journalist is a party [in a libel action], and successful assertion of the 
refusing to identify, even in camera, the source for a story that led to the dismissal of a 
school employee). 
 222. When a liquor company sued an IRS agent for leaking supposedly confidential 
information from a tax audit, it sought to compel a Phoenix newspaper reporter to 
identify other unnamed IRS sources.  A federal district court rejected the reporter’s claim 
based on the First Amendment and the Arizona shield law.  United Liquor Co. v. Gard, 
88 F.R.D. 123, 131-32 (D. Ariz. 1980).  But the court upheld the reporter’s claim that 
testifying could violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  United 
Liquor v. Gard, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1345, 1349 (D. Ariz. 1981).  As the appellate 
court noted, federal tax law left open the possibility that publishing such information was 
a federal crime.  In re Seper, 705 F.2d 1499, 1501 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7213(a)(3) made it unlawful to publish tax information “disclosed in a manner 
unauthorized by this title . . . .”); see also Bischoff v. United States, 25 Media L. Rep. 
(BNA) 1286 (E.D. Va. 1996) (quashing subpoena requiring a reporter to identify IRS 
agents who leaked taxpayers’ records). 
 223. The Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, creates a right of action against agencies that 
improperly disclose personal information about individuals.  Dr. Wen Ho Lee, a scientist 
employed at the Department of Energy’s Los Alamos laboratory, was suspected of 
passing nuclear secrets to the People’s Republic of China.  In early 1999, unnamed 
sources in the Departments of Justice and Energy and the FBI leaked information about 
Lee’s supposed espionage.  After further investigation, Lee was indicted on fifty-nine 
counts of mishandling computer files; he pleaded guilty to one count and the government 
dismissed the rest.  In December 1999, Lee sued the three agencies for having leaked 
personal information about him and his wife in violation of the Privacy Act.  After 
extensive discovery, Lee subpoenaed five journalists seeking the identities of the leakers.  
A district court ordered five of the journalists to testify.  See Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 287 
F. Supp. 2d 15, 24-25 (D.D.C. 2003); Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 327 F. Supp. 2d 26, 26-28 
(D.D.C. 2004).  The appeals court affirmed the order for four, Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 
413 F.3d 53, 61-64 (D.C. Cir. 2005), aff’d 428 F.3d 299 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (4-4 
vote), and later a different, fifth reporter was also cited for contempt, Lee v. Dep’t of 
Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2005).  The case ended in June 2006 when the 
government and the five news organizations reached a $1.6 million settlement with Lee.  
The news organizations contributed $750,000.  “Specialists in media law said such a 
payment by news organizations to avoid a contempt sanction was almost certainly 
unprecedented.”  Adam Liptak, News Media Pay in Scientist Suit, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 
2006, at A1; see also Charles Lane, In Wen Ho Lee Case, a Blow to Journalists After the 
Fact, WASH. POST, June 6, 2006, at A3. 
 224. Lee, 413 F.3d at 60. 
 225. On the application of confidentiality law when the party from which the 
testimony is sought is also the libel defendant, see DIENES, LEVINE & LIND, supra note 3, 
at 1077-89; Patrick M. Garry, Anonymous Sources, Libel Law, and the First Amendment, 
78 TEMP. L. REV. 579 (2005). 
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privilege will effectively shield him from liability, the equities weigh 
somewhat more heavily in favor of disclosure.”226  Where shield laws 
seemingly protected the press, some courts fashioned a remedy that 
presented libel defendants with a difficult choice: they did not have to 
disclose their government sources, but neither could they rely on the 
existence of the sources in their defense.227
Criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to compel testimony 
normally strengthens their claim to override a reporter’s promise of 
confidentiality.228  But courts have proven unsympathetic to many such 
requests to uncover a reporter’s government sources.  Criminal defendants 
have failed to force disclosure to support a change of venue,229 impeach 
the credibility of government investigators,230 or discover who in a 
police department or prosecutor’s office leaked information to the press 
during an investigation or trial.231  In ruling against defendants, courts 
 226. Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 227. See Bufalino v. Associated Press, 692 F.2d 266, 271-72 (2d Cir. 1982); 
Newton v. Nat’l Broad., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 522 (D. Nev. 1985); Caldero v. Tribune Publ’g, 
562 P.2d 791 (Idaho 1977); Sands v. News America Publ’g Inc., 560 N.Y.S.2d 416 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1990); Sharon v. Time, 599 F. Supp. 538, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying summary 
judgment because libel defendant refused to identify government sources); Atlanta 
Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting reliance on 
a state shield law but finding that the libel plaintiff had not followed customary 
discovery procedures); see also Robert G. Berger, The “No-Source” Presumption: The 
Harshest Remedy, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 603 (1987) (exploring the implications of directing 
a jury to assume that there is no source when media defendants in libel cases refuse to 
disclose them to plaintiffs).  But see Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 445 A.2d 376 (N.J. 
1982) (finding that some state shield laws absolutely protect confidentiality in libel 
cases). 
 228. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 229. North Carolina v. Wallace, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1473 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
1995). 
 230. United States v. Aponte-Vega, 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2202 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992). 
 231. United States v. DePalma, 466 F. Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Rodriguez v. 
Superior Court, 601 P.2d 318 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); New Hampshire v. Siel, 444 A.2d 
499 (N.H. 1982); State v. Peterson, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2501 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
2003); North Carolina v. Rogers, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1254 (N.C. Super. Ct. 1983).  
But see United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that a reporter’s 
testimony about a conversation with a U.S. attorney who leaked information is crucial to 
defendants’ efforts to establish prosecutorial misconduct).  See generally Law Enforcement 
and the Media: Information Leaks and the Atlanta Olympic Bombing Investigation: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information 
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (reviewing how leaks from law 
enforcement agencies can compromise criminal investigations and unfairly brand some 
people as suspects). 




generally find that the journalist’s testimony might shed some light on 
the conduct of the trial—for example, reveal which parties were talking 
to the press—but would not yield exculpatory evidence.232
Despite their secrecy, grand jury proceedings sometimes spring leaks.  
Reporters’ efforts to protect their sources, government investigators in 
many instances, have met with mixed success.233  Not surprisingly, 
courts bristle at leaks from secret grand jury proceedings.234  Reporters 
are typically required to testify unless clearly protected by a shield 
law,235 or unless they successfully invoke their Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination.236  Journalists’ confidentiality claims based 
on protecting the flow of information to the public ring hollow when 
leaks spring from grand jury investigations, one court pointedly noted.237  
When an official investigation is already underway, it explained, the 
press does not serve the public by uncovering government wrongdoing 
but instead simply embellishes its report with details gleaned from a 
secret grand jury inquiry.238  Courts have similarly ordered reporters to 
reveal the identity of sources who leaked sealed court orders.239
Until recently, the factual situation presented in Branzburg, in which 
grand juries seek testimony to advance their investigations, rarely 
involved efforts to uncover reporters’ government sources.240  Unlike 
leaks from grand juries, in these cases the media has independently 
developed information sought by grand juries.241  Courts customarily 
 232. Zelenka v. State, 266 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1978). 
 233. See generally James W. Fox, Jr., The Road Not Taken: Criminal Contempt 
Sanctions and Grand Jury Press Leaks, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 505 (1992) (arguing 
that holding prosecutors in contempt for leaks from grand juries might be an appropriate 
remedy); Daniel C. Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy: Plugging the Leaks in an Empty 
Bucket, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 339 (1999) (reviewing the reasons for grand jury secrecy 
in light of the leaks from the special prosecutor’s investigation of President Clinton). 
 234. See Richman, supra note 233. 
 235. See, e.g., Beach v. Shanley, 465 N.E.2d 304 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1984). 
 236. Arizona v. Walker, 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1645 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1992). 
 237. In re Special Proceedings, 291 F. Supp. 2d 44, 59 (D.R.I. 2003). 
 238. See id.  This case led to the appointment of a special prosecutor to determine 
who leaked evidence, a videotape, from a federal grand jury probe of corruption in city 
government.  The leaker gave a television reporter great visual material for his story.  
But protecting the source, probably someone in the Justice Department, did not advance 
the investigation itself.  Id. at 59-60. 
 239. See, e.g., Roche v. State, 589 So. 2d 978 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991). 
 240. See REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, AGENTS OF 
DISCOVERY: A REPORT ON THE INCIDENCE OF SUBPOENAS SERVED ON THE NEWS MEDIA IN 
2001, at 7 (2003), available at http://rcfp.org/agents/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2006) (finding 
that, based on a survey, only three percent of 189 subpoenas issued in connection with 
criminal cases were for testimony before grand juries and these did not necessarily seek 
government sources). 
 241. For two reported cases in which reporters resisted requests to testify about their 
government sources before grand juries, see People v. Pawlaczyk, 724 N.E.2d 901 (Ill. 
2000); Andrews v. Andreoli, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
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hold that Branzburg directly controls these cases and order reporters to 
testify.242
Of the cases involving unnamed government sources, a mere handful 
dealt with the relation between leaks and governance, and then only 
indirectly.  At least twice Seymour Hersh’s investigative reporting about 
national politics and international affairs prompted demands for his 
unnamed government sources.243  In the 1985 prosecution of a Pentagon 
employee for selling classified satellite photos to Jane’s Defense Weekly, 
the court observed that “[f]requent leaks of the same classified information” 
by the government would undermine its assertion that the intelligence 
“was closely held or valuable.”244  And many reporters were shocked to 
learn in the 1970s that law enforcement officials had been scrutinizing 
their long-distance telephone records to uncover government sources 
passing along information.245  Courts rejected journalists’ First and 
Fourth Amendment challenges to the practice.246
The most direct consideration of leaks in governance came in a brief 
opinion by the New Hampshire Supreme Court.247  A 1976 series of 
articles based partly on unnamed sources exposed problems in New 
Hampshire’s Department of Probation and prompted a legislative 
hearing to remove its director.248  When the reporter refused to identify 
 242. See DIENES, LEVINE & LIND, supra note 3, at 1066-69; Douglas H. Frazer, The 
Newsperson’s Privilege in Grand Jury Proceedings: An Argument for Uniform 
Recognition and Application, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 413, 415, 419 (1984). 
 243. Desai v. Hersh, 954 F.2d 1408 (7th Cir. 1992) (seeking the identities of U.S. 
government sources, as part of a libel suit, used in a story that a prominent Indian 
politician was on the CIA’s payroll and funneled intelligence to the Nixon White 
House); In re Disclosure of Grand Jury Report, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1161 (S.D. Fla. 
1977) (seeking Hersh’s Justice Department source who leaked a sealed grand jury report 
probing allegations that the IRS abused its powers to gather tax information about 
individuals). 
 244. United States v. Morison, 18 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 1417, 1418 (D. 
Md. 1985).  Morison argued that much of the supposedly confidential information he 
was accused of selling to Jane’s had already been leaked to the press when it suited the 
government’s interests.  Morison sought testimony from three journalists who would 
buttress this assertion, and the court recognized its relevance.  The court declined, 
however, to compel this testimony if the journalists invoked a reporter-source privilege, 
which would preclude a thorough cross-examination.  In the end, one journalist did 
testify because he did not need to claim a testimonial privilege.  Id. at 1418-19. 
 245. Reporters Comm. v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 593 F.2d 1030, 1038-40 nn.17-19 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979) (providing examples of how phone records 
were used in efforts to uncover reporters’ sources). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Opinion of the Justices, 373 A.2d 644 (N.H. 1977). 
 248. Id. at 645. 




his sources in the department, the legislature asked the state supreme 
court for an advisory opinion about its authority to compel testimony.249  
Noting that the state had no shield law, the court weighed the Branzburg 
holding and the common law status of a journalist’s privilege.250  In the 
end, it concluded that the state “constitution quite consciously ties a free 
press to a free state, for effective self-government cannot succeed unless 
the people have access to an unimpeded and uncensored flow of 
reporting.  News gathering is an integral part of the process.”251  The 
court linked the success of such reporting to journalists’ ability to protect 
the identity of their sources.252
D.  The 2004-2005 CIA Leak Case 
More than thirty years after Branzburg, the federal courts finally 
grappled with a case directly pitting the ethos of leaks from government 
sources against the law of journalists’ confidentiality.  The conflict 
between journalistic and judicial conventions grew from a July 2003 op-
ed column in the New York Times contributed by former Ambassador 
Joseph Wilson.253  He had been dispatched to Niger by the CIA in 2002 
to investigate rumors that Iraq was attempting to acquire materials for 
nuclear weapons.254  In his column, Wilson charged that the White 
House had twisted intelligence about Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, a 
claim featured in the President’s State of the Union address to justify the 
2003 invasion.255  One week after the column appeared, conservative 
columnist Robert Novak wrote that “two senior administration officials” 
told him that Wilson’s wife, CIA operative Valerie Plame, had arranged 
her husband’s Niger probe.256  Similar articles, also citing unnamed 
administration officials, appeared in national media over the next days, 
and some noted that Plame had worked as a covert CIA operative.257  
Observers surmised that Bush administration sources had leaked the 
details about Plame’s CIA role to undercut her husband’s credibility as a 
critic of the Iraq war.258
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 646-47. 
 251. Id. at 647. 
 252. Id. 
 253. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 965-66 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). 
 254. Id. at 966. 
 255. Id. at 965-66. 
 256. Id. at 966 (quoting Robert Novak, The Mission to Niger, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 
14, 2003, at 31). 
 257. Id. (citing Mike Allen & Dana Priest, Bush Administration is Focus of Inquiry; 
CIA Agent’s Identity was Leaked to Media, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2003, at 1). 
 258. Id.; see also supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
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The CIA initiated a legal inquiry by asking the Department of Justice 
to find the leakers for possible prosecution under a 1972 law that 
prohibited government employees with access to classified information 
from publicly identifying covert intelligence agents.259  At first, the 
administration insisted that the Department of Justice could conduct the 
leak probe without a conflict of interest, but Attorney General John 
Ashcroft eventually recused himself, leading to the appointment of U.S. 
Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald as special counsel.260
At Fitzgerald’s behest, a grand jury subpoenaed a number of journalists, 
most of whom refused to testify because they had promised to protect 
their sources’ confidentiality.261  Fitzgerald tried to avoid a direct legal 
confrontation with the journalists by securing written statements from a 
number of administration officials who were likely sources of the leak, 
releasing reporters from honoring their promises.262  Regarding these 
waivers as coerced, some reporters continued to rebuff requests for their 
testimony and were cited for contempt.263  In the end, reporter Judith 
Miller of the New York Times served eighty-five days in jail.264  She 
eventually identified her source, the Vice President’s Chief of Staff 
Lewis “Scooter” Libby, after he sent Miller a personal note freeing her 
from her promise.265
The Special Counsel’s attempts to uncover the journalists’ sources 
produced the most searching, though still inadequate, judicial consideration 
of leaks as a distinct type of confidentiality case.  The press nevertheless 
lost each round in court.  In reviewing the contempt citations of Miller 
and Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper, the court of appeals 
rejected the appellants’ efforts to distinguish their situations from those 
presented in Branzburg.266  The press argued that Branzburg dealt only 
 259. Miller, 397 F.3d at 966 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 421). 
 260. Id.; see Michael Duffy, Leaking with a Vengeance, TIME, Oct. 13, 2003, at 29, 
33-34; Timothy M. Phelps, My Plame Problem—and Yours, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., 
Jan./Feb. 2006, at 22, 23. 
 261. Miller, 397 F.3d at 966-68. 
 262. Id. at 999-1000 (Tatel, J., concurring); see also Phelps, supra note 260, at 23-
24 (discussing Fitzgerald’s use of waivers to secure the reporters’ cooperation). 
 263. In re Special Counsel Investigation, 374 F. Supp. 2d 238 (D.D.C. 2005); In re 
Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 264. See Johnston & Stevenson, Times Reporter Gives Testimony, supra note 7. 
 265. See id.  Partly on the basis of Miller’s testimony, Libby was indicted for lying 
to the grand jury about his role in the leak.  David Johnston & Richard W. Stevenson, 
Cheney Aide Charged with Lying in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at A1. 
 266. Miller, 397 F.3d at 969 (“[T]here is no material factual distinction between the 
petitions before the Supreme Court in Branzburg and the appeals before us today.”). 




with reporters witnessing crimes, but the court concluded otherwise.  
First, it held that the Supreme Court’s decision included references to 
confidential sources.267  Second, it decided that Miller and Cooper had 
indeed witnessed a crime by receiving “information concerning the 
identity of a covert operative of the United States from government 
employees . . . .”268  The court also forcefully rejected the claim that 
Justice Powell’s concurrence somehow converted Branzburg, which 
rejected a journalist’s First Amendment right not to testify, into a 
holding that recognized it.269  The court concluded that Powell “only 
emphasized that there would be First Amendment protection in cases of 
bad faith investigations.”270
The appellants’ secondary arguments also failed to persuade the court 
to vacate the contempt citations.  Although the judges disagreed about 
the existence of a federal common law evidentiary privilege for 
journalists, “all believe that if there is any such privilege, it is not 
absolute.”271  Even if they recognized a qualified privilege, “it has been 
overcome” here.272  The court also held that the “Special Counsel’s secret 
evidentiary submissions in support of the enforcement of the subpoenas” 
did not violate the appellants’ due process rights.273  Finally, the court 
ruled that the Department of Justice’s guidelines for issuing subpoenas 
to the news media did not create a legally enforceable right and “merely 
guide[d] the discretion of the prosecutors.”274
Although Judge David S. Tatel concurred in the outcome, he exhibited 
considerable sympathy for protecting the confidentiality of some 
journalistic informants in an opinion that grappled with leaks and their 
role in governance.275  Tatel argued that Branzburg might offer modest 
support for journalistic confidentiality in some grand jury contexts.276  In 
this case, however, he concluded that the claim “for a constitutional 
privilege appears weak indeed with respect to leaks” because the 
reporter’s testimony would probably be the only way to prove a crime 
when the offense was the disclosure itself.277
Looking to the common law, however, Judge Tatel noted that Federal 
Rule of Evidence 501, enacted by Congress three years after Branzburg, 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 971-72. 
 270. Id. at 972. 
 271. Id. at 973. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 987 (Tatel, J., concurring). 
 275. Id. at 986-87. 
 276. Id. at 987. 
 277. Id. at 988. 
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gives courts latitude to fashion an evidentiary privilege for journalists.278  
“[G]iven the many leaks that no doubt occur in this city [Washington] 
every day, it would be naïve to suppose that it will be the last.  For the 
sake of reporters and sources whom such litigation may ensnare, we 
should take this opportunity to clarify their relationship.”279  Reporters 
rely on confidences as do doctors, lawyers, and even psychotherapists, 
Tatel observed, and thus should be able to protect confidentiality in 
some circumstances.280  Otherwise, “[r]eporters could reprint government 
statements, but not ferret out underlying disagreements among officials; 
they could cover public governmental actions, but would have great 
difficulty getting potential whistleblowers to talk about government 
misdeeds. . . .”281  Tatel pointed to state shield laws and the Justice 
Department’s subpoena guidelines as providing both a rationale for a 
federal common law privilege as well as “a strong indication that leakers 
demand such protection.”282
Tatel’s opinion appreciates some of the nuances that distinguish leak 
cases from other legal disputes over journalists’ confidentiality: “Because 
leak cases typically require the government to investigate itself, if leaks 
reveal mistakes that high-level officials would have preferred to keep 
secret, the administration may pursue the source with excessive zeal, 
regardless of the leaked information’s public value.”283  Thus, “the 
dynamics of leak inquiries afford a particularly compelling reason for 
judicial scrutiny of prosecutorial judgments regarding a leak’s harm and 
news value.”284  Furthermore, the privilege, if one exists, belongs here to 
the reporter to “safeguard[] public dissemination of information.”285  In 
contrast, traditional evidentiary privileges enable sources to block the 
disclosure of information.286  This distinction becomes pivotal when 
 278. Id. at 988-89 (“[A]uthorizing federal courts to develop evidentiary privileges 
in federal question cases according to ‘the principles of the common law as they may be 
interpreted . . . in the light of reason and experience.’  FED. R. EVID. 501.”).  Congress 
enacted this rule in Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1933 (1975). 
 279. Miller, 397 F.3d at 990. 
 280. Id. at 989-93 (arguing that an evidentiary privilege for reporters would serve 
the public interest as much as the privilege for psychotherapists recognized by the Court 
in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996)). 
 281. Id. at 991. 
 282. Id. at 993. 
 283. Id. at 998-99. 
 284. Id. at 998. 
 285. Id. at 1000. 
 286. Id. at 999-1000. 




prosecutors secure waivers from the government sources who may have 
leaked, as the Special Counsel did,  “[A] source’s waiver is irrelevant to 
the reasons for the privilege.”287
Though he rejected absolute protection for journalists, Tatel would 
apply a variant of the customary three-prong qualified privilege.  He 
acknowledges that in leak cases the first two elements—need and 
exhaustion—“will almost always be satisfied, leaving the reporter’s 
source unprotected . . . .”288  Tatel’s common law privilege therefore relies 
heavily on a balancing test for its third element: “Specifically, the court 
must weigh the public interest in compelling disclosure, measured by the 
harm the leak caused, against the public interest in newsgathering, 
measured by the leaked information’s value.”289 Applying his balancing 
test to the CIA leak case, Judge Tatel concluded that “no privilege bars 
the subpoenas.”290  He believed that the possible harm caused by leaking 
the name of a covert CIA operative outweighed its informational value 
to the public.291  In reaching this conclusion, Tatel noted that Congress 
had criminalized such disclosures because earlier leaks had possibly led 
to the death of intelligence agents.292  The balance also tipped in favor of 
compelling disclosure because of the “sinister motive” behind the leaks 
to punish an administration critic.293  “[D]iscouraging leaks of this kind 
is precisely what the public interest requires.”294
IV.  TWO PERSPECTIVES ON THE ROLE OF LEAKS IN GOVERNANCE 
A thorough understanding of the varied purposes behind leaks in 
modern political communication should guide any effort to realign 
confidentiality law.295  Most scholars, along with journalists, regard 
leaks as primarily a form of news management by sources for political 
gain.296  This perspective, though undeniably important, has overshadowed 
 287. Id. at 1000.  The release may also have been secured through coercion. 
 288. Id. at 997. 
 289. Id. at 998. 
 290. Id. at 1003. 
 291. Id. at 1001-04. 
 292. Id. at 996. 
 293. Id. at 1003. 
 294. Id. 
 295. To explicate the modern use of leaks, this Part draws on examples from World 
War II, where Part II left off, through the Clinton administration.  By ending in 2000, 
this Article attempts to sketch enduring patterns in the media’s use of unnamed government 
sources without getting embroiled in the partisan disputes surrounding recent leaks and 
the litigation they spawned. 
 296. For studies of the Washington press corps that treat leaks mainly as a form of 
political maneuvering, see DOUGLASS CATER, THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 
128-41 (1959); RITCHIE, supra note 129, at xiii-xiv, 141, 227-34; WILLIAM L. RIVERS, 
THE OPINIONMAKERS passim g(1965); ROSTEN, supra note 102, at 82; LEON V. SIGAL, 
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another view that sees leaks as a form of communication within and 
between organizations.  In this view, the anonymous disclosure of 
information through the mass media supplements the transmission of 
messages sent along the formal channels of intra and intergovernmental 
communication.297  These complementary perspectives highlight the 
varied functions of leaks in modern governance. 
A. Leaks for Political and Policy Purposes 
With power in the federal government widely dispersed and partly 
derived from public opinion, officials maneuver to shape the news that 
surrounds policymaking as well as that which affects their own political 
standing or that of their allies and enemies.  Government officials and 
politicians tailor leaks to serve these ends.  Leaks have considerable 
utility in launching and advancing policies as well as crippling them, in 
enhancing the political status of the leaker and the leaker’s patron or in 
undercutting enemies, and in cultivating favorable relations with reporters 
for long-term gain.  Of course, a single leak can serve multiple purposes. 
1. Leaks to Influence Policy 
Sources use leaks for two basic policymaking maneuvers—to promote 
and undermine plans—and for a number of subsidiary reasons.  Officials 
turn to leaks when they want to test policy options, warm up public and 
REPORTERS AND OFFICIALS: THE ORGANIZATION AND POLITICS OF NEWSMAKING 131-50 
(1973).  Similarly, journalists reflecting on the role of leaked information also typically 
view the practice as a political maneuver.  See, e.g., Thomas Griffith, Just Don’t Quote 
Me, TIME, Dec. 10, 1979, at 126; Thomas Griffith, A Sinking Feeling About Leaks, TIME, 
Dec. 22, 1980, at 81; Richard Halloran, A Primer on the Fine Art of Leaking 
Information, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1983, at A16; Mark Hosenball, Leak-a-Boo: A 
Washington (Dis)information Guide, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 12, 1987 at 23; Howard Kurtz, 
How Sources and Reporters Play the Game of Leaks, WASH. POST NAT’L WKLY. ED., 
Mar. 15-21, 1993, at 25; Flora Lewis, Leaks and Stories, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1982, at 
E23; Tom Wicker, Leak On, O Ship of State!, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1982, at A15; see 
also STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 88TH CONG., GOVERNMENT 
NEWS FROM ANONYMOUS SOURCES (Comm. Print 1964) (discussing leaks as both 
political maneuvers and as efforts by government to communicate with domestic and 
foreign audiences); Dahlan, supra note 1, at 2-5, 19-38 (reviewing the pre-1967 literature 
on leaks). 
On leaks as political maneuvering in Britain, see MICHAEL COCKERELL, PETER 
HENNESSY & DAVID WALKER, SOURCES CLOSE TO THE PRIME MINISTER 31-33, 45, 128, 
130-35, 139, 183-84, 234 (1984); BERNARD INGHAM, THE WAGES OF SPIN 88-89, 94, 
110-11, 134, 187-88 (2003). 
 297. See Dahlan, supra note 1; infra Part IV.B. 




congressional opinion, influence the context of deliberations, and more.  
Officials seeking the widest publicity often leak to the New York Times 
and Washington Post to reach these publications’ influential readers as 
well as to “set the agenda” for broadcast news programs with more 
general audiences later in the day.298
One of the most venerable types of leaks, a trial balloon, allows a 
source to gauge the reaction of key agencies, clientele organizations, or 
the public before openly embracing a policy.299  White House initiatives 
to overhaul health care, Social Security, or tax policy are typically 
preceded by leaks to assess the probable fate of various options.300  
Administrations also test the viability of potential nominees for important 
positions by floating trial balloons.301  The White House sometimes conducts 
polls after it leaks a policy option to formally gauge the public’s 
response.302  Although used mainly in connection with domestic policy, 
trial balloons can also help the White House predict international 
response to a foreign policy or military initiative.303  The chief advantage 
of trial balloons, of course, is that sources simply deny that they ever 
formally embraced a proposal whose prospects appear bleak after the 
leak, thereby saving both face and political capital.304
 298. MARK HERTSGAARD, ON BENDED KNEE: THE PRESS AND THE REAGAN 
PRESIDENCY 122-23 (1988) (noting that the White House routinely leaked to the Times 
and Post “overnight, which set the agenda for the next day’s TV stories,” according to 
United Press International correspondent James Anderson). 
 299. For early twentieth-century examples, see supra notes 109-11 and accompanying 
text. 
 300. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Health Aides See a Tax on Benefits Beyond Basic Plan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1993, at A1 (discussing how the Clinton administration used leaks 
as it developed proposals for national health care policy).  When the Clinton 
administration was segueing from the trial balloon leak stage to promoting specific 
policies, “several journalists . . . pleaded with them [senior administration officials] to 
permit disclosure of their names.”  A White House spokesman refused: “We want to 
explain and communicate our policies to the American people, and we think background 
discussions are a good way of doing it.”  Id. at A38; see also Keith Erickson, Presidential 
Leaks: Rhetoric and Mediated Political Knowledge, 56 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 199, 202 
(1989) (discussing Ford and Carter administration leaks about possible new taxes on 
gasoline that were abandoned because of the negative public response). 
 301. See, e.g., Griffith, A Sinking Feeling, supra note 296, at 81 (discussing 
negative congressional response to Reagan administration trial balloons about possible 
cabinet nominees). 
 302. See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 300, at 202 (discussing the Carter administration’s 
polling of national and international opinion about a boycott of the 1980 Olympics then 
under consideration and floated via a trial balloon). 
 303. See, e.g., BRUCE LADD, CRISIS IN CREDIBILITY 113 (1968) (discussing President 
Johnson’s trial balloon to gauge international reaction, especially that of the Soviet 
Union, to the contemplated bombing of Haiphong harbor in North Vietnam). 
 304. Douglass Cater provides a good example of how trial balloons allow sources to 
tell seemingly contradictory public and private stories and yet just manage to remain 
truthful.  In 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles talked to reporters, on the 
condition that they not use his name, about a possible Korean boundary settlement.  The 
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A well-designed trial balloon can do more than simply gauge reaction 
to a tentative policy.  Trial balloons can pave the way for negotiations 
between the White House and Congress, as when President Ronald 
Reagan signaled through a leak his willingness to reduce the 1983 
military budget if lawmakers cut social programs.305  In the hands of a 
master manipulator like President Lyndon Johnson, a trial balloon 
became a political feint.  On one occasion he directed an aide to plant a 
story about a possible administration move to cut support for domestic 
rice growers.306  Johnson had no such plans, but the leaked story 
prompted the desired response: rice growers and lawmakers from 
affected districts met with Johnson to plead for their program.307  The 
President offered to drop the nonexistent plan in return for their support 
on other matters.308  Another variation on trial balloons involves leaking 
several policy options, including highly unpopular ones, to ease the 
public into accepting a distasteful course of action.309
Beyond testing policy options, a promotional leak discloses information 
that advances a policy favored by the source.  Because most promotional 
leaks spring from institutions’ upper echelons, one veteran Washington 
reporter famously observed that the ship of state is the only vessel that 
leaks mainly at the top.310  President Kennedy’s press secretary concurred, 
noting that a leak “generally occurs when Presidents and governments 
hostile reaction on Capitol Hill prompted the White House to issue a “denial, drafted by 
none other than Dulles himself, which stated that ‘the Administration has never reached 
any conclusion that a permanent division of Korea is desirable or feasible . . . .’”  CATER, 
supra note 296, at 136-37.  The operative phrase, “never reached any conclusion,” while 
literally true, “was not, in fact, what it seemed—a clear repudiation of what Mr. Dulles 
told the reporters and what they wrote, perforce on their own authority, for their papers.”  
Id. at 137. 
 305. See Erickson, supra note 300, at 201.  Erickson notes that “presidential leaks 
rhetorically accom[m]odate congressional decision-making by signaling negotiable 
positions, impending decisions, and presidential ‘leanings.’” Id. at 211. 
 306. MICHAEL B. GROSSMAN & MARTHA J. KUMAR, PORTRAYING THE PRESIDENT: 
THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE NEWS MEDIA 175-76 (1981). 
 307. Id. at 175. 
 308. Id. at 175-76. 
 309. See, e.g., LADD, supra note 303, at 108-09 (discussing how the Johnson 
administration used a trial balloon-like leak to “psychologically prepar[e] the public to 
accept” more troops in Vietnam). 
 310. JAMES RESTON, THE ARTILLERY OF THE PRESS: ITS INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 66 (1967); Griffith, A Sinking Feeling, supra note 296, at 81; see also 
WILLIAM MCGAFFIN & ERWIN KNOLL, ANYTHING BUT THE TRUTH: THE CREDIBILITY 
GAP—HOW THE NEWS IS MANAGED IN WASHINGTON 106-23 (1968) (discussing leaks, 
many competing with each other, from the White House, leading members of Congress, 
and agency heads during the 1950s and 1960s). 




wish to advance a certain viewpoint and pass to newspaper men 
documents or information of a confidential nature which would advance 
this point of view.”311  Such leaks allow newsmakers “to orchestrate 
coverage from behind a curtain of anonymity.”312  They can be deployed 
in combination with any of about twenty other techniques, most overt, 
that agencies use to cultivate a favorable information environment 
surrounding a policy.313  Thus, Presidents have leaked classified data 
about Soviet military strength, satellite photos, and less sensitive 
information to advance their policies.314  Alexander Haig, Secretary of 
State during the Reagan administration, noted that despite the problems 
caused by some leaks, “in the end I concluded that they were a way of 
governing.  Leaks constituted policy; they were the authentic voice of 
the government.”315
Crippling leaks, in contrast to promotional leaks, disclose information 
that undermines a policy or counters an agency’s intended action.  They 
often provide insights into the policymaking process and prompt rebukes 
from agencies trying to keep their deliberations secret.  Crippling leaks 
stem from interagency rivalries, disagreements between the executive 
and legislative branches, and tension between political appointees and 
the civil servants they direct.316  For instance, one military service might 
 311. Memo from Pierre Salinger to Theodore Sorenson, quoted in GROSSMAN & 
KUMAR, supra note 306, at 282. 
 312. Kurtz, supra note 296, at 25. 
 313. Id.  A source’s tools for shaping a favorable information environment include 
communication plans, press conferences, op-ed contributions, official reports, staged 
events, media tours, arrangements for traveling media, news features, background 
briefings, video news releases, print public relations, meetings with columnists, meetings 
with editorial boards, meetings with reporters, press guidances, press briefing books, 
polls, and multiple uses of the Internet.  Patrick O’Heffernan, Mass Media and U.S. 
Foreign Policy: A Mutual Exploitation Model of Media Influence in U.S. Foreign Policy, 
in MEDIA AND PUBLIC POLICY 187, 198-99 (Robert J. Spitzer ed., 1993). 
 314. See, e.g., DAVID WISE, THE POLITICS OF LYING: GOVERNMENT DECEPTION, 
SECRECY, AND POWER 104-05, 108-09 (1973) (discussing leaks by the administration of 
classified information, including details of Soviet military strength, whose release was 
designed to pressure Congress to accept the President’s budget); Hosenball, supra note 
296, at 24 (discussing the leak of satellite photos supposedly supporting administration 
claims of Soviet assistance for communists in Latin America). 
 315. ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., CAVEAT: REALISM, REAGAN, AND FOREIGN POLICY 
17 (1984). 
 316. See, e.g., HUGH HECLO, A GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS: EXECUTIVE POLITICS 
IN WASHINGTON (1977) (discussing power relationships between a department’s political 
leaders and its top bureaucrats); JOHN B. MEDARIS WITH ARTHUR GORDON, COUNTDOWN 
FOR DECISION 244-47 (1960) (discussing the Army’s use of leaks to elicit support from 
Congress in opposing a shift of resources to NASA); ROGER HILSMAN, TO MOVE A 
NATION: THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 
71 (1967) (discussing a leak designed to get Congress to block the transfer of some 
duties from the State Department to the CIA even though State was willing to relinquish 
them).  On leaks from Congress and the Pentagon intended to undermine administration 
plans to increase troop deployments in Vietnam, see MARVIN KALB & ELIE ABEL, ROOTS 
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leak information disparaging another service’s proposed weapons system 
so that its competing system is approved.317  In one Machiavellian maneuver 
involving all three services, the Army leaked to the press an Air Force 
staff paper that deprecated the Navy’s newest aircraft carriers.318  Some 
crippling leaks involve international ploys.  American officials displeased 
with changes in foreign policy can leak information to the press that 
brings pressure from overseas to bear inside the Capital Beltway.319  
Because leaks can undermine administration initiatives, officials in the 
executive branch worry about them more than members of Congress and 
sporadically order investigations to ferret out the sources.320
Sources also wield leaks for more subtle tactical purposes than simply 
supporting or opposing a policy.  Officials in a position to manufacture 
news, such as the President, can leak an important story to overshadow 
the newsmaking efforts of a rival,321 or to save face by circulating 
explanations for unpalatable decisions.322  Sources use leaks to affect the 
policymaking process by speeding up or delaying deliberations.323  Sources 
OF INVOLVEMENT: THE U.S. IN ASIA, 1784-1971, 238 (1971); WISE, supra note 314, at 
283-84. 
 317. See, e.g., JAMES BAAR & WILLIAM HOWARD, POLARIS! 215-16 (1960); WALTER 
MILLIS, ARMS AND THE STATE: CIVIL-MILITARY ELEMENTS IN NATIONAL POLICY 241-42 
(1958); JACK RAYMOND, POWER AT THE PENTAGON 198-201 (1964). 
 318. By making it appear as though the Air Force was undermining the Navy, the 
Army drove a wedge between the two services and strengthened its own position.  
MICHAEL H. ARMACOST, THE POLITICS OF WEAPONS INNOVATION: THE THOR-JUPITER 
CONTROVERSY 93 n.31 (1969). 
 319. See, e.g., SIGAL, supra note 296, at 142 (discussing an Air Force leak to arouse 
European opposition to American plans for changes in NATO); MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, 
THE UNCERTAIN TRUMPET 41-42 (1959) (discussing how a leak about U.S. plans to 
withdraw troops elicited enough international opposition to thwart the plan). 
 320. See MARTIN LINSKY, IMPACT: HOW THE PRESS AFFECTS FEDERAL 
POLICYMAKING 136 (1986); see also infra note 431 (reviewing leak investigations under 
several Presidents). 
 321. See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 300, at 202 (discussing several Presidents’ leaks 
of upbeat news to drown out bad). 
 322. See, e.g., JEB STUART MAGRUDER, AN AMERICAN LIFE: ONE MAN’S ROAD TO 
WATERGATE 200 (1974) (explaining how the Nixon White House leaked a cover story to 
account for shifting the Republican national convention out of San Diego). 
 323. See, e.g., LINSKY, supra note 320, at 80, 185 (providing examples of how leaks 
accelerated action by officials and also were used, unsuccessfully, to forestall action).  
More generally, Linsky’s survey of officials found that leaks may influence the 
policymaking process as much as the output.  “Policymakers expect leaks, anticipate 
their impact, take preventative measures, and use them strategically themselves.”  Id. at 
188.  To minimize the possibility of leaks, policymakers narrow the range of policy 
options they consider, limit the number of people involved in decisionmaking, and put 
less information in writing.  Id. 




also leak stories to control the timing and context of making news 
public.  To mitigate the damage from negative stories that CBS was 
about to air, the Clinton White House leaked the same information to 
newspapers shortly before the broadcast, thus determining the timing 
and avoiding the “hyperventilated” and “accusatory” tone of much 
television news.324
2. Leaks to Shape Personal Images 
Policy considerations figure in nearly all leaks, but some are 
motivated primarily by a desire to influence a person’s political standing 
positively or negatively, and only indirectly to influence deliberations.  
Officials can burnish their own or an ally’s image through leaked stories.  
President Kennedy, for instance, cooperated with journalists writing a 
behind-the-scenes account of the decisionmaking during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis.325  The article underscored Kennedy’s resolve in confronting 
the Soviet Union, a portrayal that immediately boosted his standing with 
the public and left a record that influenced historians’ interpretations.326  
In a so-called “reverse blame leak,” stories about Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig reported undiplomatic remarks he had made about world 
leaders at a staff meeting.327  Although the leak ostensibly appeared to harm 
Haig, in fact it repaired his image of “not being tough enough for the 
job” by presenting him as “a confident and independent official with his 
own point of view.”328  As Vice President, Nixon used leaks to distance 
himself from positions held by President Dwight Eisenhower.329
Sources involved in intra-administration personal rivalries and especially 
those behind salacious attacks on opponents find it imperative to 
 324. HOWARD KURTZ, SPIN CYCLE: INSIDE THE CLINTON PROPAGANDA MACHINE 42-
44 (1998). 
 325. See DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST 28 (1972); see also 
ELIE ABEL, LEAKING: WHO DOES IT? WHO BENEFITS? AT WHAT COST? 33-34 (1987) 
(discussing carefully crafted leaks by the White House that gave the New York Times 
direct quotes from Kennedy’s exchanges with the Soviet foreign minister showing the 
President’s resolve). 
 326. Id. 
 327. LINSKY, supra note 320, at 195. 
 328. Id.  HECLO, supra note 316, at 226 n.11, recounts a daring reverse leak: 
While jockeying with another staff member, the [Presidential] assistant leaked 
a disclosure of his own impending removal from the West Wing.  The 
opponent, who obviously stood the most to gain from the story, was naturally 
asked to confirm or deny the report.  Since he was not yet strong enough to 
accomplish such a removal, the opponent had to deny responsibility for the 
leak and its accuracy, thereby inadvertently strengthening the position of the 
presidential assistant who first leaked the story. 
 329. See FRANCIS E. ROURKE, SECRECY & PUBLICITY: DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRACY 
201 (1961). 
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maintain anonymity as they use the news media to fight their battles.  
Under Lyndon Johnson, the White House leaked information about 
sexual escapades of both Democrats and Republicans.330  In the Nixon 
White House, the “plumbers” unit leaked information about those on its 
enemies list, including a photograph of Edward Kennedy in Rome 
standing next to an attractive woman; the National Enquirer and later 
Newsweek published it.331  Leaks have been used to undermine rivals 
competing for the President’s attention and to shift blame or settle 
grudges.332  Nancy Reagan leaked news to a favorite luncheon companion, 
columnist George Will, to blame chief of staff Donald Regan for failing 
to protect President Reagan in the Iran Contra affair.333  High stakes 
political battles, such as Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s investigation 
of President Clinton, often degenerate into endless dueling leaks filled 
with personal information.334  Most recently, the stories at the center of 
the CIA leak investigation involved, in part, such hostile leaks.335
3. Leaks to Improve Relations with Reporters 
Sources, especially high status ones, employ several means for 
ingratiating themselves with reporters, including dispensing leaks.336  
 330. See Erickson, supra note 300, at 203. 
 331. See MAGRUDER, supra note 322, at 66-71.  The White House plumbers unit 
involved in the Watergate break-in was originally set up to plug Pentagon Papers-like 
leaks but, ironically, also planted its own stories.  It leaked information that attacked 
Daniel Ellsberg, who had leaked the Pentagon Papers, and it also mined classified 
documents from the Kennedy administration to leak stories that tarnished the former 
President’s image.  See DANIEL ELLSBERG, SECRETS: A MEMOIR OF VIETNAM AND THE 
PENTAGON PAPERS 425-43 (2002).  But see WISE, supra note 314, at 278-81 (discussing a 
story leaked by the Nixon White House designed to embarrass the chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Board that backfired when reporters saw through the ploy). 
 332. See, e.g., BERNARD C. COHEN, THE PRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY 197 (1963) 
(discussing the use of news by two foreign policy officials to promote their competing 
approaches to disarmament in the Eisenhower administration); Kurtz, supra note 296, at 
25 (providing examples of leaks arising from intra-administration feuds during the 
presidency of George H. W. Bush); LINSKY, supra note 320, at 185 (discussing leaks from 
the Reagan White House to shift blame for an embarrassing policy). 
 333. See Joel Connelly, Nancy Reagan Has Risen Above Her Detractors’ Barbs, 
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 11, 2004, at A2. 
 334. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 335. See HESS, supra note 1, at 77 (defining the animus leak as one “used to settle 
grudges.  Information is disclosed to embarrass another person.”). 
 336. See GROSSMAN & KUMAR, supra note 306, at 283-88 (listing several ways 
sources ingratiate themselves with reporters: courting elite journalists, cultivating 
friendships, performing direct favors, and throwing them raw meat—that is, giving a 
hostile reporter good information). 




The goodwill leak, where a source bestows a “scoop” on a favorite 
reporter, earns credit that might later prove valuable.337  “This type of 
leak is often on a subject with which the leaker has little or no personal 
involvement and happens because most players in governmental 
Washington gather a great deal of extraneous information in the course 
of their business and social lives.”338  Maintaining good relations with 
reporters is probably a “subsidiary motivation” behind most leaks.339  
Rewarding reporters with leaked information also enables sources to 
divert attention from more sensitive topics.340  For instance, as an avid 
leaker, Colonel Oliver North ingratiated himself with reporters, making 
them reluctant to vigorously investigate and publicize his role in the 
Reagan administration’s covert sale of arms to Iran.341
B. Leaks as Organizational Communication 
Besides their role in political maneuvering and policymaking, leaks 
facilitate governance by supplementing the formal channels of organizational 
and inter-organizational communication.342  From this perspective, leaks 
to the press annex the mass media to relay information among government 
decisionmakers outside the official communication network.343  The 
Reagan administration, for instance, converted the New York Times, 
Washington Post, news magazines, and television networks into “White 
 337. HESS, supra note 1, at 77.  WISE, supra note 314, at 328-36, reports how a 
small gesture by Lyndon Johnson, bestowing a seemingly minor leak on a new reporter 
covering the President, snowballed into a major political event.  “Before it was over, the 
stock market was shaken, the Federal Reserve Board had raised the discount rate, and the 
nation appeared, at least briefly, to be in the grip of a serious economic crisis.”  Id. at 
328-29. 
 338. HESS, supra note 1, at 77; see also LINSKY, supra note 320, at 194-95 (providing 
examples of information leaked to maintain favorable relations with reporters). 
 339. SIGAL, supra note 296, at 142. 
 340. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 332, at 204. 
 341. See ABEL, supra note 325, at 27. 
 342. See generally DORIS A. GRABER, PUBLIC SECTOR COMMUNICATION: HOW 
ORGANIZATIONS MANAGE INFORMATION (1992) (providing an overview of communication 
structures and practices in government agencies).  Now-classic works by political 
scientists, economists, and organizational behaviorists from the late 1940s through the 
1960s moved intra- and inter-organizational communication to center stage in 
understanding governmental decisionmaking.  See, e.g., KARL W. DEUTSCH, THE NERVES 
OF GOVERNMENT: MODELS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL (1963); ANTHONY 
DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967); RICHARD NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE 
POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP (1960); HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A 
STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 1957); 
HAROLD L. WILENSKY, ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: KNOWLEDGE AND POLICY IN 
GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY (1967). 
 343. “The news media serve as a network to convey messages through a 
governmental system that is extremely decentralized and that has no consistently 
effective internal communications system.”  GROSSMAN & KUMAR, supra note 306, at 31. 
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House bulletin boards,” on which staff posted leaks to communicate 
“with other officials and agencies of the U.S. government, and even with 
foreign governments.”344  Information leaked to the press thus becomes 
available to the public although it is aimed primarily at a narrow, 
attentive audience of other decisionmakers.  The targeted receivers may 
work in the organization from which the leak originated, in other agencies, 
or even in other governments.  A survey of high-ranking federal officials 
confirms that some of their leaks had a major communicative component 
distinct from their purposes as policy maneuvers.345
News leaks overcome common failings of organizational communication.  
Agency structure can constrain the volume of messages transmitted in 
different directions, slow message relay, and distort the message as it is 
conveyed from source to receiver.346  Leaks thus supplement inadequate 
internal channels, bypass obstacles, and serve as an antidistortion device.  
As a type of subformal communication, the messages conveyed by leaks 
“can be withdrawn, altered, adjusted, magnified, or canceled without any 
official record being made.”347  Additionally, information leaked to the 
press can be more persuasive for the recipient than messages sent 
through formal channels.  Leaked information, however, suffers from its 
own communication pitfalls.  The press can garble messages much as 
agency gatekeepers distort information they relay through channels.  
Furthermore, the cryptic nature of news leaks means that some intended 
receivers never see the messages and, if they do, they can misinterpret 
them or wrongly infer the identity of the source.348
 344. HAIG, supra note 315, at 18 (noted by Secretary of State). 
 345. LINSKY, supra  note 320, at 230-39, reports survey results from 483 senior 
federal officials who served in executive branch agencies, Congress, and independent 
commissions between the Johnson and Reagan administrations.  When asked about 
leaks, 73% said they had used them to “gain attention for an issue or policy option,” 
which could have both a policy and a communicative dimension; 30% “to inform other 
officials of a policy consideration or action”; 14% to “reveal your bargaining position on 
an issue”; and 32% to “send a message to another branch of government.”  Most of the 
other reasons for leaking clearly involved policy maneuvers.  Id. 
 346. On organizational structure and impediments to full, accurate information 
flows, see DOWNS, supra note 342, at 112-31; GRABER, supra note 342, at 94-101; 
EVERETT M. ROGERS & REKHA AGARWALA-ROGERS, COMMUNICATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 
77-107 (1976); Frederic M. Jablin, Formal Organization Structure, in HANDBOOK OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION 389 (Frederic M. Jablin et al. eds., 1987); Charles A. 
O’Reilly, Jennifer A. Chatman, & John C. Anderson, Message Flow and Decision 
Making, in id. at 600. 
 347. DOWNS, supra note 342, at 113. 
 348. See Dahlan, supra note 1, at 130-93 (reviewing the problems targets encounter 
in deciphering the source and import of leaks, especially foreign governments attempting 




1. Leaks as Upward Communication 
Lower-level officials sometimes leak information to the press to 
communicate with the upper echelons of their own agency.  Leaks of 
this type partly redress two problems with upward communication.  
Messages in the press stand out from the clutter of routine organizational 
intelligence that competes for superiors’ attention, and they also bypass 
intermediaries who obstruct the upward flow of embarrassing information.349
“Communicating out of channels” is a common response to the “dilemma 
of hierarchy vs. intelligence,” according to a prominent political scientist.350  
From reading newspapers, especially the New York Times and Washington 
Post, Presidents and agency heads learn of issues bottled up in their 
bureaucracies.351  In the Pentagon Papers case, a veteran New York 
Times reporter asserted that “[m]iddle-rank officials” routinely leaked 
information to “attract the attention of their superiors.”352  Estrangement 
between civil service employees and politically appointed agency heads 
also breeds leaks as a kind of upward communication.353  Even the 
leaders of state agencies learn to scan the press for information about 
their own departments.354
The State Department and other bureaucracies in which information 
flows from distant outposts through many desks and bureaus are 
especially prone to use leaks as a tool for upward communication.  “I 
found it easier to bring my views to bear on the President of the United 
States by way of The Washington Post and its New Delhi correspondent 
to infer the meaning of a communication sent via the press); HESS, supra note 1, at 93 
(questioning the “utility and rationality of leaks as an intragovernmental means of 
communications” because their cryptic nature means that “there are so many different 
interpretations of what is being accomplished, by whom, and for what purposes . . . .”). 
 349. On problems with upward flows in government bureaucracies, see Dahlan, 
supra note 1, at 72-73; DOWNS, supra note 342, at 116-18; GRABER, supra note 342, at 
95-96, 107-09. 
 350. WILENSKY, supra note 342, at 46. 
 351. MORTON H. HALPERIN, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 173, 
179-80 (1974).  Halperin notes that a President’s aides scan the media for leaked stories 
in the days before a press conference because these are likely subjects for questions.  
“Thus an official anxious to bring an issue to the attention of the President may plant a 
story with the expectation that the subject will then come up in the preparation for the 
press conference.”  Id. at 180; see also Carol H. Weiss, What America’s Leaders Read, 
38 PUB. OPINION Q. 1 (1974) (discussing the importance of the New York Times and 
Washington Post as news sources for federal officials). 
 352. SANFORD J. UNGAR, THE PAPERS AND THE PAPERS 167 (1972) (quoting New 
York Times Washington bureau chief Max Frankel); see also Dahlan, supra note 1, at 75 
(noting that leaks sometimes attract more attention than official announcements); 
MEDARIS, supra note 316, at 246 (noting a leak designed to inform the President of 
disagreements among lower level bureaucrats). 
 353. See HECLO, supra note 316, at 208-09. 
 354. DELMER D. DUNN, PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE PRESS 102-03 (1969). 
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than by way of the State Department,” an ambassador to India once 
asserted.355  Similarly, U.S. officials in Saigon during the early days of the 
Vietnam War discovered that some of their assessments of the situation 
were more likely to be noticed in Washington if published in influential 
newspapers than if communicated through institutional channels.356  
Upward leaks have considerable utility even in a flat bureaucracy such 
as Congress.  Congressional aides with easy access to members of 
Congress leak information to attract their bosses’ attention because 
memoranda might literally lie buried in a stack of documents or at best 
compete for attention with other pressing issues.357
Whistleblowers who leak information to the press sometimes turn to 
the media only after obstacles in an agency’s internal communication 
system prevent them from informing superiors about problems.  In such 
cases, leaks surmount organizational hurdles.358  The unauthorized release 
of the Pentagon Papers and Deep Throat’s leaks to the Washington Post 
both raised concerns that had not been successfully addressed through 
official channels.359  In the Pentagon Papers case, Daniel Ellsberg first 
attempted to communicate his findings to government officials; he 
leaked to the press only when members of Congress hesitated to act.360  
As Deep Throat, FBI Deputy Director Felt leaked information about 
Watergate to the Washington Post because his immediate superior, the 
acting director of the agency, had just been appointed by Nixon and was 
 355. SIGAL, supra note 296, at 135 (quoting Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith’s 
affidavit filed in the Pentagon Papers case, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)). 
 356. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 332, at 243 (discussing State Department leaks of 
information that sources hesitated to send through formal channels); HILSMAN, supra 
note 316, at 499 (discussing maneuvers to get competing assessments of the situation in 
Vietnam noticed in Washington); JOHN MECKLIN, MISSION IN TORMENT: AN INTIMATE 
ACCOUNT OF THE U.S. ROLE IN VIETNAM 223 (1965) (discussing Ambassador Henry 
Cabot Lodge’s use of leaks to attract attention from Saigon). 
 357. Susan H. Miller, Reporters and Congress: Living in Symbiosis, JOURNALISM 
MONOGRAPHS, No. 53, at 4 (1978). 
 358. See Lea P. Stewart, “Whistle Blowing”: Implications for Organizational 
Communication, 30 J. COMM. 90 (1980); see also MYRON P. GLAZER & PENINA M. 
GLAZER, THE WHISTLEBLOWERS: EXPOSING CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 
48-50, 167-77 (1989) (discussing whistleblowing generally and with some attention to 
the role of the press); Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A 
False Hope for Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355 (1991) (reviewing the role of 
government whistleblowers and noting the shortcomings of statutory protections). 
 359. These two examples also have elements of crippling leaks, discussed supra 
text accompanying notes 316-20. 
 360. ELLSBERG, supra note 331, at 181-83, 323-29, 356-64. 




obstructing the investigation.361  He even went as far as burning some of 
the suspects’ documents.362  Although whistleblowing leaks rarely 
approach the significance of Deep Throat’s, such communications by 
unidentified news sources remain a valuable safety valve in our system 
of government. 
2. Leaks as Downward Communication 
At first glance, Presidents and agency heads would seem unlikely to 
leak information to the press to communicate with their subordinates.  
But even when ample channels exist for downward communication, 
leaks can be useful in conveying information.363  Leaks to the press 
percolate quickly to the lower levels of a large bureaucracy and capture 
subordinates’ attention.  Information that “appears to have been pried 
loose rather than officially communicated” is more salient to staff.364
Sitting atop a huge bureaucracy, Presidents have found leaks to the 
press a useful mechanism for communicating their wishes to those who 
formulate and implement policy.365  For example, when Lyndon Johnson 
wanted the State Department to tone down its efforts to promote a 
multilateral force (MLF), he drafted a memo for internal circulation and 
leaked the story to the New York Times.366  “Unlike an internal 
memorandum with limited circulation inside the executive branch, a 
press clipping could be cited as proof of the President’s wishes by 
opponents of the MLF on both sides of the Potomac and the Atlantic.”367  
A leak signaling the President’s (or other executive’s) preference serves 
as a “hunting license” to subordinates who share the same goals.368  
Leaks can also direct subordinates to ignore public pronouncements.  A 
President who strikes a public posture to appease some interest group 
can, via a leak, signal the bureaucracy to discount the public statement.369  
Distasteful or delicate decisions, such as the need for a Presidential aide 
to resign, can also be communicated through leaks.370
 361. See O’Connor, supra note 11, at 129, 131. 
 362. Id.; see also WOODWARD, supra note 11, at 96-97. 
 363. See GRABER, supra note 342, at 101-05 (discussing the impediments to 
successful downward communication in organizations). 
 364. GROSSMAN & KUMAR, supra note 306, at 31. 
 365. HALPERIN, supra note 351, at 286. 
 366. Id. 
 367. SIGAL, supra note 296, at 136-37; see also PHILIP GEYELIN, LYNDON B. 
JOHNSON AND THE WORLD 174-76 (1966). 
 368. HALPERIN, supra note 351, at 180. 
 369. GROSSMAN & KUMAR, supra note 306, at 31. 
 370. For example, Eisenhower’s chief of staff, Sherman Adams, embarrassed the 
administration by taking gifts from a Boston industrialist in return for influencing 
regulatory proceedings.  To hasten Adams’ departure without forcing a public confrontation, 
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3. Leaks as Horizontal Communication Within and                               
Between Governments 
Bureaucrats use leaks to convey information to other departments of 
their own agency, to other agencies, to another branch of government, 
and even to foreign governments.  In a sense, all such messages are 
horizontal intra- or inter-organizational communication. 
When leaks convey information between units of government, they 
partly bridge communication gaps created by the separation of powers.  
Scholars of organizational behavior term this “boundary spanning.”371  
Such messages short circuit, usually in a positive way, the tortuous path 
messages follow if transmitted through the chain of command of two or 
more agencies.372  The media “serve as a means of supplementing the 
internal lines of communication of the sprawling federal establishment.”373  
Members of Congress, for example, have few opportunities to question 
the President directly and must rely upon reports in the press, many based 
on leaks, to obtain clues about the White House position on some matters.374
The dispersion of power within legislative bodies creates many centers 
of decisionmaking with imperfect channels for exchanging information.  
A study of Wisconsin government found that “legislative leaders, more 
than other officials, rely on newspapers for intra-organizational 
information.”375  Likewise, the communication channels in Congress 
provide only limited information exchange between the two chambers.376  
the President authorized a leak that Adams’ days in the White House were numbered.  
See id. at 172-73. 
 371. See GRABER, supra note 342, at 106-07, 189-97, 247 (discussing horizontal 
communication within agencies and communication that spans organizational 
boundaries).  Structural problems government agencies face in spanning organizational 
boundaries create an especially important role for the press in supplementing formal 
communication channels, Graber notes.  Id. at 196-97. 
 372. For a mid-level official to communicate with a counterpart in another agency 
through the formal chain of command, a message must be relayed upward to the first’s 
superior, laterally to the second’s superior, and finally downward to the receiver.  Not 
only does this delay receipt, but it also increases the chances for message distortion 
during transmission.  See DOWNS, supra note 342, at 115-27.  Of course, a number of 
strategies other than leaking information to the press can be used to bypass 
intermediaries. 
 373. V. O. KEY, JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 405 (1963). 
 374. DOUGLASS CATER, POWER IN WASHINGTON: A CRITICAL LOOK AT TODAY’S 
STRUGGLE TO GOVERN IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL 14 (1964). 
 375. DUNN, supra note 354, at 112 (emphasis omitted). 
 376. Harrison W. Fox, Jr. & Susan W. Jammond, The Growth of Congressional 
Staffs, in CONGRESS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT 112, 120-23 (Harvey C. Mansfield, Sr., ed., 
1975). 




Senators and Representatives thus keep abreast of developments in their 
own institution partly by following news reports.377
Leaks have proven so useful in communicating between governments 
that the diplomatic establishment recognizes several subtypes, including 
leaks to signal or clarify intentions, induce discussions, and alter the 
course of negotiations.378  Although governments have formal means of 
communicating with each other, relaying messages anonymously through 
the media enjoys several advantages.  The media can transmit information 
outside the often rigid international bureaucracies faster and more 
efficiently, and news in high-status publications commands the respect 
of diplomats.379  Furthermore, news accounts can signal a government’s 
intentions without committing it to a particular proposal, and stories 
about negotiations between two countries apprise other governments of 
developments.380  Media reports can even substitute for formal talks when 
parties are deadlocked and no longer meeting, and news can send messages 
between governments that have no formal diplomatic relations.381
During crises, governments send messages through an array of formal 
and informal channels to prevent misunderstandings that can produce 
catastrophic consequences.382  While negotiating with the Soviet Union 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy was acutely aware 
 377. Delmer D. Dunn, Symbiosis: Congress and the Press, in CONGRESS AND THE 
NEWS MEDIA 240, 242-43 (Robert O. Blanchard ed., 1974). 
 378. See Dahlan, supra note 1, at 99-109. 
 379. For the most thorough discussion of leaks as international communication, see 
id. at 94-128. 
 380. Id.  During the Nixon and Ford administrations, Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger frequently leaked information as a “senior State Department official”: 
Everybody really knew that I was the senior official.  The advantage of doing 
it in this manner was that it enabled foreign governments not to have to take a 
formal position about what I had said, and not to force me to take a formal 
position.  Since everybody in the negotiations was, theoretically, pledged to 
secrecy, but at the same time, since everybody was giving a briefing on their 
own version, I felt it was important that the American version also be 
available, so we all played this complicated game. 
JEFF BLYSKAL & MARIE BLYSKAL, PR: HOW THE PUBLIC RELATIONS INDUSTRY WRITES 
THE NEWS 61-62 (1985); see also, e.g., DORIS GRABER, MASS MEDIA AND AMERICAN 
POLITICS 266-71 (7th ed. 2006); R. A. R. Maclennan, Secrecy and the Right of 
Parliament to Know and Participate in Foreign Affairs, in SECRECY AND FOREIGN 
POLICY 132, 141 (Thomas M. Franck & Edward Weisband eds., 1974) (noting that 
European Union nations leak information to communicate with each other). 
 381. See Dahlan, supra note 1, at 106-28. 
 382. During the 1956 Middle East crisis, when little news was conveyed formally 
through White House and State Department press conferences, cloaked news filled the 
gap.  CATER, supra note 296, at 130.  “During the most critical period in recent months, 
at a time when any word out of Washington was considered of international significance, 
what had developed, it appeared, was government by leak,” an unidentified 
newspaperman remarked.  Id. 
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that a garbled message could trigger a nuclear exchange.383  He supplemented 
the direct, formal contacts between Washington and Moscow with 
indirect communications through the press, including some leaked 
information.384  But this episode also illustrated the dangers posed by 
leaks as intergovernmental communication.  The Soviet Union misread a 
prominent American newspaper columnist’s suggestion for a diplomatic 
solution as a leak authorized and subscribed to by the administration.385
V.  ENHANCED PROTECTIONS FOR LEAKS IN CONFIDENTIALITY LAW 
News leaks have figured in the nation’s governance since the early 
days of the Republic.  Yet the law of journalists’ confidentiality 
developed before and after Branzburg without sufficiently recognizing 
leaks as a form of politics, policymaking, and intra or intergovernment 
communication.  Confidentiality law must be recalibrated to protect the 
indispensable role that certain types of leaks play in modern 
governance.386
A. Legal Rationales for Protecting Leaks 
At bottom, most leaks are a form of political speech.  They express 
partisan disagreements, support or oppose policies, relay intelligence 
 383. See GRAHAM T. ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION: 
EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 214-30 (2d ed. 1971); PIERRE SALINGER, WITH 
KENNEDY 285-302 (1966). 
 384. See ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 383, at 214.  Kennedy had similarly used 
leaks to convey his intentions to the Soviet Union in 1961 over U.S. resolve to remain in 
Berlin.  See JAMES RESTON, DEADLINE: A MEMOIR 469-70 (1991).  Kennedy “did not 
want to make the crisis worse by making a personal declaration to this effect.  It would, 
however, be ‘helpful,’ he said mildly, if I wrote in the Times on my own authority that 
this was his clear intention.”  Id. 
 385. Walter Lippmann wrote a column suggesting that the United States should 
withdraw its missiles from Turkey if the Soviet Union would do likewise in Cuba.  
Lippmann’s intimate connections with the Kennedy administration were well known to 
the Kremlin, and Moscow interpreted this proposal as an authentic offer tendered by the 
White House.  Although Lippmann’s column had often carried administration leaks in 
the past, this time the ideas were his own, and the Kremlin’s misinterpretation created 
some consternation.  See MONTAGUE KERN, PATRICIA W. LEVERING & RALPH B. 
LEVERING, THE KENNEDY CRISES: THE PRESS, THE PRESIDENCY, AND FOREIGN POLICY 
129-30 (1983); see also WISE, supra note 314, at 78-80 (discussing how President 
Johnson mistakenly blamed Robert Kennedy for a foreign affairs leak). 
 386. The proposal presented here addresses only aspects of journalists’ confidentiality 
pertaining to leaks from government sources.  It does not tackle many other legal issues 
that arise in connection with journalists’ confidentiality. 




within and among governments, and assure a robust flow of information 
to the public.  The CIA leak case, for instance, began as a dispute over a 
single sentence in the 2003 State of the Union Address.387  The political 
controversy then mushroomed into a years-long probe that threatened 
several journalists with contempt and jailed one before prompting yet 
another round of proceedings seeking reporters’ confidential information, 
this time for use by a criminal defendant.388
Such intrusion by law into the realm of political communication 
deviates from the tradition of according speech about government the 
greatest possible latitude.  In Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-
Government, political philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn forcefully 
argues that the First Amendment fully protects speech about public 
affairs.389  The Supreme Court has reinforced Meiklejohn’s precepts 
through the preferred-freedom theory of the First Amendment by making 
it extremely difficult for the government to impose certain restraints on 
the press.390  Notably, the Court has made it nearly impossible to impose 
prior restraints on the press,391 for judges to gag reporters who obtain 
information in open court,392 and for public officials to prevail in libel 
suits.393  These and other Court rulings, along with much soaring judicial 
prose, attest to the special place that speech about government occupies 
in the American system of free expression.394
Key attributes and functions of leaks already enjoy some legal 
recognition.  Courts acknowledge the value of anonymous speech, 
 387. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
 388. Appointed in December 2003, Special Counsel Fitzgerald won an indictment 
of Libby in October 2005.  See Johnston & Stevenson, supra note 265.  In early 2006, 
Libby’s defense attorneys indicated that they planned to subpoena the journalists 
questioned by Fitzgerald.  See Carol D. Leonnig, Libby Team to Subpoena Media, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2006, at A7. 
 389. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); see also Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an 
Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 (presenting his view that speech about governance 
should be absolutely protected). 
 390. The Court launched the preferred position (or freedom) theory in United States 
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).  It suggested that restrictions on 
freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights should be subject to “more exacting judicial 
scrutiny” than restrictions on other interests.  Id. at 152-53 n.4; see also GILLMOR ET AL., 
supra note 188, at 22-23. 
 391. New York Times v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971); 
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1935). 
 392. Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
 393. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 394. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“Whatever differences 
may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal 
agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of 
governmental affairs.”); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the 
libertarian tradition that defines press freedom in relation to government). 
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especially in connection with discussions of public affairs;395 leaks 
obviously require anonymity.  Law enforcers often invoke a privilege to 
shield the identity of their informants;396 leaks similarly allow informants in 
government to communicate with other officials or the public.  Government 
speech has a legitimate role in democracies;397 many leaks, notably 
authorized messages, constitute speech on behalf of a government agency 
or a policy position.  In a similar vein, but with different implications, 
case law and whistleblower statutes afford government employees’ 
speech some protection;398 the most valuable leaks function the same 
way as employee speech by disclosing wrongdoing or disagreements 
within agencies.  Finally, courts strenuously resist calls to referee speech 
 395. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).  Talley relied heavily on a historical 
review of the importance of anonymous political communication.  Id. at 62 & n.3, 64-65; 
see also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (protecting the confidentiality of 
membership lists so as not to chill freedom of association). 
 396. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 306 (1967); Roviaro v. United 
States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961).  But 
cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 697-98 (1972) (distinguishing the informant’s 
privilege from a journalist’s privilege). 
 397. “Participation by the government in the system of freedom of expression is an 
essential feature of any democratic society.  It enables the government to inform, 
explain, and persuade—measures especially crucial in a society that attempts to govern 
itself with a minimum use of force.”  THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION 698 (1970); see also, e.g., 2 CHAFEE, supra note 18, at 723-82; Frederick 
Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373 (1983) (book 
review).  Some analysts, however, fear that government speech might dominate the 
marketplace of ideas and that any protections for such speech can not be found in the 
First Amendment’s negative admonition.  See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT 
SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983); Randall P. 
Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 
1377, 1502 (2001). 
 398. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 
U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).  Connick refined 
a balancing test first presented in Pickering to protect a public employee’s speech when 
it dealt with matters of public concern, which “must be determined by the content, form, 
and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”  Connick, 461 U.S. at 
147-48.  Garcetti refined the test further, indicating that public employees’ statements 
made in the course of their work deserve less First Amendment protection than similar 
remarks they may offer as citizens.  Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.  One dissenter 
suggested, ironically, that the majority holding offered more cover for public employees 
to complain to the press than to their supervisors, which, if true, provides an incentive to 
leak.  Id. at 1965 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Similarly, some lower courts have held that 
blowing the whistle through the press partly satisfies the public concern criterion of 
Connick and Pickering.  See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 1, at 372-73.  Federal and 
state statutes protecting whistleblowers are summarized and discussed in MARCIA P. 
MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE 232-79 (1992). 




about politics, such as candidates’ charges and counter-charges at 
election time;399 leaks often stem from similar partisan bickering. 
Treating leaks as political or governmental speech rather than as an 
element of newsgathering would also enhance their constitutional 
standing.  Although Branzburg acknowledges that newsgathering is not 
without First Amendment protections, the Court has been loath to 
expressly recognize a constitutionally based public right to know except 
in cases involving access to trials.400  To be sure, federal statutes such as 
the Freedom of Information Act create limited rights of access,401 and 
dicta in First Amendment cases are replete with references to the 
importance of an informed citizenry.402  But Justice Stewart, whose 
dissent in Branzburg evinced considerable sympathy for the press, 
nonetheless warned about relying too heavily on the people’s right to 
know as an asserted First Amendment right: “There is no constitutional 
right to have access to particular government information, or to require 
openness from the bureaucracy. . . .  The Constitution itself is neither a 
Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.”403  For governance, 
leaks occupy the territory between a Freedom of Information Act and 
Official Secrets Act; they spring from “the tug and pull of the political 
forces in American society” that ultimately regulate press access to 
government information.404
 399. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 
(1989) (recognizing that the First Amendment prevents regulation of the content of 
campaign speech); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (granting broad 
protection to outrageous political and social commentary). 
 400. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (“This Court has never 
intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information 
within government control.”).  Two years later, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the Court recognized the right of the public and press to 
attend criminal trials, one specific component of gathering news.  Chief Justice Warren 
Burger wrote the Court’s opinion in both cases. 
 401. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
 402. Advocates of a constitutionally based people’s right to know invariably cite 
James Madison: “A popular government, without popular information, or the means of 
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or Tragedy; or, perhaps both.”  Letter from 
James Madison to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).  For the argument that a right of access to government 
information can be inferred from constitutional jurisprudence, see Thomas I. Emerson, 
Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 14.  But cf. Thomas I. 
Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795, 831 (1981) 
(conceding that the right of access suggested by Richmond Newspapers might be quite 
limited). 
 403. Stewart, supra note 17, at 636.  For other analyses that caution against pushing 
arguments about the public’s right to know too far, see David M. O’BRIEN, THE PUBLIC’S 
RIGHT TO KNOW: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 166 (1981); James C. 
Goodale, Legal Pitfalls in the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 29. 
 404. Stewart, supra note 17, at 636 (“The public’s interest in knowing about its 
government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect.”). 
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B.  A Proposal to Protect Leaks 
To safeguard the special role of leaks, disputes about the identity of 
government sources should be distinguished from routine journalists’ 
confidentiality claims.  Reclassifying leaks as a form of political 
communication enhances their constitutional status by establishing 
presumptions against identifying sources associated with a preferred-
freedom balancing test.  Reviewing the widely varied nature of leaks, as 
sketched in Part IV, would allow courts to tailor their decisions to 
protect anonymity where it advances the most vital forms of political 
communication.  Congress might also use this approach as it considers 
enacting a shield law.  States could do likewise as they rework existing 
statutory protections. 
The first step in securing protection for leaks is to revisit Wigmore’s 
criteria for conferring evidentiary privileges: 
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that  
 they will not be disclosed; 
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and 
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties; 
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community 
ought to be sedulously fostered; and 
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the 
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for 
the correct disposal of litigation.405 
Pre-Branzburg court decisions and commentators proceeded with the 
largely unexamined premise that journalists’ confidentiality claims did 
not satisfy Wigmore’s criteria, and they certainly never considered leaks 
as a distinct category.406  Thus, the body of decisions that culminated in 
 405. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 1-2 (2d ed. 1923). 
 406. Wigmore did not disguise his hostility to an evidentiary privilege for 
journalists.  He referred to the Maryland shield law “as detestable in substance as it is 
crude in form” and inaccurately predicted in 1923 that it “will probably remain unique.” 
Id. § 2286, at 4 n.7.  Wigmore’s criteria for granting evidentiary privileges did not 
change between the 1923 edition of his treatise and the Court’s reliance on his work in 
Branzburg.  See 408 U.S. 665, 691 n.29 (1972); compare 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, 
at 1-2 (2d ed. 1923), with 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev. 
1961) (indicating only changes in punctuation).  But see James A. Guest & Alan L. 
Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 NW. 
U. L. REV. 18, 26-27 (1969) (arguing shortly before Branzburg that “a literal application 
of Wigmore’s conditions to the issue of the newsman’s privilege borders on sophistry 
and drastically misconstrues the problem”). 




Banzburg failed to seriously apply Wigmore’s test.407  Now the issue 
should be judged anew, particularly for leaks. 
Leaks satisfy Wigmore’s first confidentiality requirement by definition.  
As for the second criterion regarding the essential nature of the secrecy, 
officials admittedly have considerable self-interest in maintaining 
relations with the press even without expectations of confidentiality.  
But the leaks that contribute most to governance—those involving 
whistleblowing and policy disputes—are also the ones most dependent 
on concealing a source’s identity. 
Wigmore’s third and fourth criteria require an assessment of leaks’ 
value to society.  Leaks have enhanced political communication for two 
hundred years despite fundamental change in the nation’s press, politics, 
and government.  They have functioned as a necessary part of governance, 
which addresses Wigmore’s third requirement.  The fourth criterion invites 
judges or legislatures to balance the value of leaks against evidentiary 
needs in different contexts.  Judge Tatel’s concurrence in the CIA leak case 
took a first step in that direction.408  In at least one vital respect pertinent 
to Wigmore’s third and fourth criteria, reporters’ confidentiality surpasses 
the societal value of traditional evidentiary privileges (lawyer-client, 
doctor-patient, and clergy-penitent).  Journalists shield their government 
sources to provide the public, and indirectly the legal system, with more 
information about public affairs.  In stark contrast, lawyers, doctors, 
clergy, and others invoke long recognized privileges to assure that less 
information becomes public.409
Consequently, confidentiality law, at least as it applies to leaks from 
government sources, should be reconceived along the following lines.  
The party seeking disclosure of a reporter’s government sources should 
first prove relevancy and exhaustion of alternative sources, requirements 
already widely accepted and often easily satisfied.  The outcome in most 
leak cases will thus turn on balancing the benefits of preserving 
confidentiality against the importance of the source’s identity in a legal 
action.  This is essentially the “compelling need” test from Stewart’s 
Branzburg dissent as recognized in many shield laws and court 
decisions.  In striking this balance, courts should treat most leaks from 
government sources as a form of political speech with its attendant 
protections.  Starting with a presumption against disclosure, the party 
 407. In pressing for a federal shield law in the wake of Branzburg, Representative 
Charles W. Whalen, Jr., a Republican of Ohio, argued that journalists’ claim for an 
evidentiary privilege satisfied Wigmore’s requirements.  See 1973 House Hearings, supra 
note 174, at 177-78; CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., YOUR RIGHT TO KNOW 147-54 (1973). 
 408. See supra text accompanying notes 288-94. 
 409. See Fred S. Siebert, Professional Secrecy and the Journalist, 36 JOURNALISM 
Q. 3, 6-8 (1959). 
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seeking a source’s identity would have a burden to prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the need for the testimony outweighed the 
value of protecting this form of political communication.  The balancing 
should consider the merits of political communication in the case at hand 
as well as its implications for chilling similar speech in the future.  For 
instance, forcing disclosure of a whistleblower’s identity in one case 
might discourage others from stepping forward. 
Judgments about the contributions of a leak to governance, and hence 
the variable weight accorded to it in a balancing test, should be informed 
by an analysis along the lines of the one presented in Part IV.  At one 
end of the continuum are leaks that perform an indispensable role in 
political speech.  Whistleblowing and anonymous communications from 
sources inside agencies registering disagreements with policies fit here 
because the formal channels of government often bottle up such 
messages.410  These leaks honor the long tradition of the press serving as 
a check on government.  Furthermore, such leaks counterbalance all the 
tools government uses to communicate, or spin, official policy. 
Less but still considerable weight should be accorded leaks that 
communicate information from one agency to another or signal the 
positions of key players.411  Through such leaks, the press facilitates 
government decisionmaking.  Leaks from ongoing investigations conducted 
by grand juries, the police, the FBI, and the like also fall in the middle 
range.  If obtaining inside information is merely a scoop for a media 
outlet, prematurely publicizing information that would ultimately 
come out anyway, then a leak deserves little weight in balancing 
against the need to reveal the source.412  However, where leaks stimulate 
an investigation and keep it on track, as in Watergate, then protecting 
confidentiality warrants much greater deference.413  At the opposite end 
of the spectrum, deserving little weight for their negligible contributions 
to governance, are leaks advancing personal goals.  These leaks use 
anonymous messages to burnish or attack reputations.414  When courts 
address government leak cases as a distinct subset of journalists’ 
confidentiality claims, they can further refine the variable weight to accord 
different types of anonymous messages conveyed through the press. 
 410. See supra notes 316-20, 358-62 and accompanying text. 
 411. See supra notes 371-77 and accompanying text. 
 412. See supra notes 234-39 and accompanying text. 
 413. See supra notes 11, 361-62 and accompanying text. 
 414. See supra notes 325-35 and accompanying text. 




Journalists, First Amendment stalwarts, and even judges might recoil 
at the prospect of having courts pass judgment on good versus bad leaks 
and probe the motives of sources and journalists.415  But courts already 
have experience conducting inquiries into the journalistic and political 
contexts of news stories.  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 
an important forum for leak cases, devised a test that relied extensively 
on judgments about the context of a story to determine whether allegedly 
defamatory statements should be treated as opinion or factual assertions.416  
Other questions of libel and privacy law417 similarly require courts to delve 
into the context of a news story.  Weighing the political context of a leak 
thus represents nothing new for courts.  Stories themselves often provide 
cues that can assist in categorizing a leak.418  And courts can evaluate a 
reporter’s source information in camera to gain a better sense of whether 
protecting the identity outweighs the need for disclosure.419
Focusing on the role of leaks in governance also obviates difficult 
decisions about who qualifies as a professional communicator entitled to 
a testimonial privilege.  Branzburg expressed serious reservations about 
recognizing “a constitutional newsman’s privilege”: 
Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen 
who qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the 
traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer 
who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large 
metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods.420
 415. See SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 
218 (1983) (arguing from a philosophical and ethical vantage point that it is appropriate 
to distinguish between good and bad leaks). 
 416. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).  The Ollman 
test requires determining (1) whether the allegedly defamatory statement is susceptible to 
being proved true or false; (2) the ordinary meaning of the words; (3) the journalistic 
context of the remarks; and (4) the social context of the language at issue.  Id. at 979-84; 
see also Timothy W. Gleason, The Fact/Opinion Distinction in Libel, 10 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 763 (1988). 
 417. In libel law, for example, deciding whether a plaintiff is a limited-purpose 
public figure (having to prove actual malice) or a private person (having to prove only 
negligence), depends on assessing the nature of the underlying controversy, the 
plaintiff’s role in it, and the timing of the plaintiff’s involvement in relation to the 
publication of the defamatory message.  See DON PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 175-84 (2005).  
For the tort of publicizing embarrassing private facts, courts or juries must consider 
whether the intimate information is of legitimate public concern or newsworthy.  See, 
e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975); PEMBER, supra note 417, at 288-93. 
 418. A helpful analysis of contextual considerations to be used in evaluating 
confidentiality claims can be found in Levi, supra note 104, at 714-27. 
 419. On in camera review in journalists’ confidentiality cases, see DIENES, LEVINE 
& LIND, supra note 3, at 1022-24. 
 420. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703-04 (1972); see also Clay Calvert, And 
You Call Yourself a Journalist?: Wrestling with a Definition of “Journalist” in the Law, 
103 DICK. L. REV. 411 (1999); Kraig L. Baker, Note, Are Oliver Stone and Tom Clancy 
Journalists? Determining Who Has Standing to Claim the Journalist’s Privilege, 69 
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Indeed, state shield laws do vary considerably in the range of communicators 
brought within their protective ambit, which “only serves to heighten the 
concern expressed by the majority in Branzburg.”421  Today, of course, 
almost anyone can become a communicator simply by creating a Web 
site or a blog.  One judge in the CIA leak case speculated that government 
leakers could avoid detection by channeling their messages through a 
friendly blogger who would then claim an evidentiary privilege as a 
journalist.422  As a practical matter, leaking to the New York Times, 
Washington Post, and other established media remains the preferred route 
for most government sources.423  But if leaks start springing from more 
ephemeral media, legal judgments about journalists’ confidentiality 
should turn on the nature of the leak—specifically its place in 
governance—rather than the nature of the communicator conveying it. 
The threshold for forced disclosure of journalists’ government sources 
should also vary with the legal setting in which a leaker’s identity is 
sought.  Courts and legislatures could reasonably set a higher bar for 
disclosure in the investigative phase of an inquiry than in adjudicating 
outcomes,424 a distinction recognized for government informants.425  
WASH. L. REV. 739 (1994).  Frederick Schauer, however, believes that First Amendment 
jurisprudence could make constitutionally defensible and socially beneficial distinctions 
among communication institutions and their personnel.  See Schauer’s articles cited 
supra note 21. 
 421. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 980-81 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (Sentelle, J., concurring) (sketching the range of communicators covered by state 
shield laws); Anthony L. Fargo, Analyzing Federal Shield Law Proposals: What 
Congress Can Learn from the States, 11 COMM L. & POL’Y 35, 50-51, 56-59 (2006). 
 422. Miller, 397 F.3d at 979-80 (“[W]ould it not be possible for a government 
official wishing to engage in the sort of unlawful leaking under investigation in the 
present controversy to call a trusted friend or a political ally, advise him to set up a Web 
log (which I understand takes about three minutes) and then leak to him under a promise 
of confidentiality the information which the law forbids the official to disclose?”).  This 
scenario parallels one suggested in Branzburg long before the Internet: groups establishing 
“‘sham’ newspapers” to shield their criminal activities by invoking a journalist’s privilege.  
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 705 n.40.  Such subterfuges to cloak leaks by manufacturing a 
reporter-source relationship seem farfetched. 
 423. Even in the age of the Internet, government leakers prefer established media as 
outlets.  The established media directly reach Washington decisionmakers, involve 
journalists with whom sources have already cultivated relationships and, if litigation 
ensues, reporters for such media can draw on their employers’ considerable legal and 
financial resources to shield the source. 
 424. In the wake of Branzburg, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws considered a model shield law that would have protected journalists 
from compelled testimony in investigative proceedings but required testimony in some 
trials.  See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 174, at 131-33 (testimony of Professor 
Vincent Blasi presenting the draft shield law); David Shipler, Model Newsmen’s 




Ironically, Branzburg’s grip on confidentiality law has produced the 
opposite effect.  Lower courts hesitate to deny grand jury requests for 
compelled testimony because the Supreme Court ruling dealt expressly 
with that situation.426  By their nature, however, investigative proceedings 
such as grand jury probes and legislative hearings cast a wide net, 
operate with fewer checks than trials, and serve as but a preliminary step 
for later action if warranted.427  Subpoenas issued to journalists in the 
course of investigative and adjudicative proceedings thus “are vastly 
different, both in terms of their evidentiary gain and also in terms of the 
damage they do, the fears they generate, [and] the climate they create 
which is the real problem.”428  Fifteen years before Branzburg, the 
Supreme Court also recognized the dangers of compelled testimony in 
investigations.  “It is particularly important that the exercise of the power of 
compulsory process be carefully circumscribed when the investigative 
process tends to impinge upon such highly sensitive areas as freedom of 
speech or press, freedom of political association, and freedom of 
communication of ideas.”429
For trials, in contrast, a lower threshold for compelled disclosure of a 
source’s identity might adequately protect the contributions of leaks to 
governance because such adjudications proceed with a tighter focus and 
more rigorous safeguards.  Criminal defendants clearly have a strong 
constitutional claim to compel exculpatory testimony and prosecutors 
should be entitled to nearly the same consideration for trials.  For civil 
proceedings, judges need to safeguard political communication by 
limiting discovery when it intrudes into confidential relations between 
government sources and the press.430  Libel suits, however, warrant a 
Privilege Law Being Drafted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1973, at 32.  Some of the federal 
shield bills considered by Congress in the mid-1970s also provided absolute protection 
for journalists appearing before grand juries but less protection for trials, an approach 
that won grudging support from prominent news organizations.  See VAN GERPEN, supra 
note 148, at 169.  It should be noted that these proposals did not distinguish between 
leaks and other types of journalists’ confidentiality claims, as does this Article. 
 425. Compare United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (protecting the identity 
of an informant for investigatory purposes, specifically for securing a search warrant), 
with Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (holding that an informant’s identity 
should be disclosed at trial when central to the defense). 
 426. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
 427. But see Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 687-88 (explaining the reasons for according 
grand juries such wide latitude). 
 428. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 174, at 129 (remarks of Professor Vince 
Blasi); see also Reporters and Their Sources, supra note 149, at 345-58 (offering an 
extended argument for protecting journalists’ confidentiality in grand jury and legislative 
investigations). 
 429. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 245 (1957). 
 430. See Reporters and Their Sources, supra note 149, at 358-60 (arguing for an 
absolute journalists’ privilege in civil litigation except for libel suits, though without 
distinguishing between government and other sources). 
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lower threshold for disclosure.  When the plaintiff has established falsity 
and clearly needs a government source’s identity to prove fault, either 
actual malice or negligence, a media defendant should not be able to 
shield the source to avoid liability. 
Finally, the contribution of leaks to political communication entitles 
them to special consideration when a government agency seeks to unveil 
a source’s identity.  To do otherwise invites officials, who enjoy considerable 
discretion in these matters, to pursue leaks they dislike even as they 
sponsor their own leaks, as has nearly every administration since World 
War II.431  This raises the specter of content or viewpoint discrimination 
 431. All administrations since World War II have conducted investigations to find   
the sources of unwelcome leaks, usually unsuccessfully.  On leak investigations during 
the 1950s and 1960s, see ROURKE, supra note 329, at 78-80; SIGAL, supra note 296, at 
145-47; WISE, supra note 314, at 284-86; Dahlan, supra note 1, at 70-71.  On 
investigations during the Ford administration, see JOSEPH C. SPEAR, PRESIDENTS AND THE 
PRESS 284-85 (1984).  On investigations during the Carter administration, see id. at 287-
88.  On investigations during the Reagan administration, including efforts to restrict 
officials’ contacts with the press and give suspected informants polygraph tests, see 
A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LAW & NAT’L SECURITY, THE MEDIA AND GOVERNMENT 
LEAKS passim (Patricia Garvin Cathcart & Deborah Fletcher eds., 1984); LAURENCE I. 
BARRETT, GAMBLING WITH HISTORY: RONALD REAGAN IN THE WHITE HOUSE 429-36 
(1983); HERTSGAARD, supra note 298, at 140-47; HESS, supra note 1, at 86-92; SPEAR, 
supra, at 29-31, 292.  On investigations during the George H. W. Bush administration, 
see Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Would Oust Rio Memo’s Leaker, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1992, 
at A5.  On investigations during the Clinton administration, see Debra G. Hernandez, 
Investigating Leaks, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Apr. 13, 1996, at 14.  See also GROSSMAN & 
KUMAR, supra note 306, at 280 (quoting officials on difficulties in tracking down 
leakers); HESS, supra note 1, at 88 (citing a General Accounting Office study that 
between 1975 and 1982 the Department of Defense investigated sixty-eight leaks); Alan 
M. Katz, Government Information Leaks and the First Amendment, 64 CAL. L. REV. 108 
(1976) (analyzing criminal and civil actions against leakers in the 1960s and 1970s). 
Congress has also conducted a number of leak investigations.  One that is especially 
revealing suggests that while Congress publicly deplores leaks from its ranks, it actually 
prefers not to inquire too deeply.  In 1991, the Senate appointed a temporary special 
independent counsel to investigate leaks from the Senate confirmation hearings for 
Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas and leaks from the Ethics Committee about 
five Senators suspected of improper dealings with the head of a savings and loan 
company.  The special counsel carefully documented the leaks in the two cases and 
railed against the congressional culture of leaking, but could not identify any leakers.  
See S. DOC. NO. 102-20, pt. 1 (1992).  The special counsel complained that “[t]he 
journalists possessed the evidence which was most relevant to fulfilling the mandate of” 
the investigation, id. at 78, but the Senate declined to grant authority to compel their 
testimony.  See S. DOC. NO. 102-20, pt. 2, at 22-24 (1992).  The special counsel 
concluded that Congress did not truly want to jeopardize “the continued ability and 
perhaps even the right of senators and staff persons to disclose confidential information 
with a certainty that their anonymity will be secure.”  S. DOC. NO. 102-20, pt. 1, at 80. 




for political speech.432  Because unauthorized leaks augment and even 
challenge messages dispensed through official channels, they function as 
“[i]mportant safety valves in the U.S. government.”433  They deserve 
deference, and a higher burden of proof to compel disclosure, for 
journalists in confidentiality cases. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Outwardly, government and the press have changed dramatically since 
the 1795 leak of the Jay Treaty.  Yet leaks function in much the same 
fashion today: they facilitate government decisionmaking while 
augmenting information available to the public.  As the locus of federal 
policymaking during the nineteenth century, Congress was initially the 
source of most leaks and launched occasional investigations to discover 
journalists’ informants.  By the end of the century, however, most members 
of Congress accepted leaks as an element of governance and thereafter 
rarely demanded that journalists disclose their sources.  The rise of the 
administrative state, including the ascendancy of the White House, 
provided another impetus for leaking to the press to communicate within 
and across the sprawling, ever more complex federal establishment.  
Thus, by the mid-twentieth century, leaks had become a common tool of 
governance, even during such crises as World War II and the Cold War. 
Viewed historically and functionally, anonymous communications 
from government sources to the press can be distinguished from other 
situations that present legal questions about journalists’ confidentiality.  
The media’s traditional claim for shielding their sources—to assure an 
unfettered flow of information to the public—undervalues the significance 
of leaks and rests on shaky constitutional underpinnings.  Treating leaks 
as messages by and about government entitles them to consideration as 
political speech and honors their institutional role in a democratic 
society.  Not all leaks deserve equal treatment under this reformulation 
and, in rare circumstances, some should still be subject to disclosure.  
But moving toward a more nuanced understanding of leaks’ varied nature 
and contributions to governance would assist judges and legislators in 
properly adjusting the interests at stake.  It would also give government 
sources and their media contacts greater predictability about the legal 
consequences, and ethical merits, of crafting stories based on leaks. 
 432. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating a hate speech 
ordinance because it punished specified viewpoints); see also KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & 
GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 193 (1999) (“The Court generally treats 
restriction of the expression of a particular point of view as the paradigm violation of the 
First Amendment.”). 
 433. HECLO, supra note 316, at 231. 
